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ABSTRACT 
The present work deals with one of the most fascinating aspect of consciousness, the awareness of 
the bodily-self, and in particular with the notion of body ownership. The goal of this thesis is to 
combine the phenomenological conception of the bodily-self, mainly grounded on the concept of 
embodiment, with the scientific investigation of the physiological bases of the sense of body 
ownership. Chapter 1 introduces the theoretical subject and its experimental investigation in both 
pathological and healthy brain, arguing that the very core of the self, as claimed by neuro-
phenomenology, is determined by the dynamic relationship between body representation and 
motor system, which enables human beings to properly act in the world and to build a coherent 
sense of self. In this view, body representation and the possibility to move are conceived as the two 
main factors allowing human beings to reach a conscious experience of the self. Can this theoretical 
insight meet scientific evidence? In other words, are we able to measure the contribution of the 
sensory-motor system in generating body ownership? This aspect of human experience was 
investigated using two experimental approaches. In Chapter 2, given that the fundamental 
characteristics of subjectivity can sometimes be illuminated through the study of their pathological 
distortions, we experimentally tested how body metric representation can be susceptible to plastic 
remapping after tool-use training, in healthy subjects (Experiment 1) and in a particular sample of 
patients in which an ischemic episode in the right hemisphere caused a disruption of body 
ownership, along with primary sensory-motor dysfunction (Experiment 2). These patients show a 
sort of complementary disease to the well-described symptoms of patients in classical 
somatoparaphrenia (delusion of dis-ownership), by showing a pathological embodiment of someone 
else’s limb (delusion of ownership). As is often the case with neuropsychological syndromes, a large 
amount of theoretical questions arises from the observation of this condition. First of all, which is 
the phenomenal experience involved? Is that condition just a confabulatory manifestation? Does 
  
6 
 
this subjective and sometimes illusory sense of body ownership influence objective measures of the 
sensory-motor system? Which is the relationship between sensory-motor impairment and body 
ownership disruption? Chapter 2 addresses these questions by demonstrating that the intentional 
motor processing which underlines the action execution with an alien limb experienced as own, 
induces body representation remapping, even in absence of actual proprioceptive feedback. Chapter 
3 investigates how a multisensory illusion that alters the sense of body ownership, the rubber hand 
illusion (RHI), affects the activity of the motor system in a sample of healthy subjects. During this 
experimental manipulation, subjects report a feeling of ownership over an artificial, rubber hand and 
a concurrent feeling of dis-ownership over their real hand. What is the mechanism underlying the 
self-attribution of the rubber hand to one’s own body? And again, which relationship is there 
between the functionality of the sensory-motor system and the feeling of body ownership? Are the 
qualia of ownership/dis-ownership reflected at the level of the motor system? We found that the 
sensation for the hand disappearing is reflected in a lower excitability of the motor pathways that 
govern the movement of the same hand, providing the first neurophysiological evidence that our 
conscious experience to have or not a body has a fundamental counterpart in the activity of the 
sensory-motor system. In conclusion, even if usually taken for granted, our conscious belief to own 
a body has a very multi-level nature. Both in presence of brain injuries and experimental 
manipulation, the sense of body ownership can be altered; only in these cases we are able to realize 
the complexity of its structure and how the brain plays an essential part in its generation. The results 
reported here are discussed in the context of phenomenological and cognitive literatures in an effort 
to understand the role of both body awareness and of sensory-motor activity as the building stones 
of the human conscious experience of being in the world. 
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Chapter 1 
1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 A body centered conception of the self, a multidisciplinary approach.  
Philosophers, psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists have widely discussed the notion of the 
body as the basis, or the starting point for our conscious experience. In the ongoing debate on the 
definition of Self-consciousness philosophers and cognitive neuroscientist are emphasizing the 
essential role of the body, conceived as the constitutive source of pre-reflective self-consciousness. 
This process of integration between phenomenological analysis and naturalistic models (Gallagher, 
2006; Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008; Parnas, Zahavi, 2000; Petitot et al., 1999; Varela, 1987; 2001; 
Zahavi, 2004) can be indicated as a recorporealization of the Self (Csordas, 1990; Thompson and 
Varela, 2001; Heiner, 2008). If we put the body at the center of the scene, the conceptualization of 
the mind given from enactivism* captures very well the significance of this process: “cognition 
depends upon the kinds of experience that come from having a body with various sensorimotor 
capacities and that these individual sensorimotor capacities are themselves embedded in a more 
encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural context” (Varela et al., 1991, pp 172-173). In 
this view, as pointed out in Fuchs, Sattel and Henningsen (2010), “Embodiment refers not only to the 
embedding of cognitive processes in brain circuitry, but also to the origins of these processes in an 
organism’s sensory-motor experience in relation to its environment”. It follows that even if the Self 
is a complex, multileveled and multidimensional notion (Parnas, 2000; 2003) “there is a basic, 
immediate or primitive something that we are willing to call self” (Gallagher, 2000, p. 15), or, in other 
words, “the feeling of the same old body always there” (James, 1890). As underlined by Merleau-
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Ponty (1945), “my body appears to me as an attitude directed towards a certain existing or possible 
task” and it makes possible our understanding of the environment as a space of likely engagements 
and actions. In this perspective the bodily-self is conceived not only as an integrated system, 
characterized by matching of sensory-motor information (Legrand 2006, p. 111), but also as power 
for action, a “sense of body that is enactive” in nature and that enables to capture the most primitive 
sense of self” (Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2010). 
 
*According to enactivism, the mind emerges from a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its 
environment. In this approach, cognition can only be understood if conceived as embedded in a total 
“biological/psychological, and cultural context” (Varela et al., 1991: 172-173); claiming that cognition “is 
based on situated, embodied agents” (Varela, 2001: 215) bring to an explicitly rejection of representationalism 
(what we consciously perceive is the result of a copy of the external world in an internal representation). The 
mind "cannot be separated from the entire organism" (Varela, 1999: 73), because “knower and known, mind 
and world, stand in relation to each other through mutual specification or dependent co-origination” (Varela 
et al., 1991: 150). Because the mind is embodied and arises out of "an active handling and coping with the 
world”, "[t]he mind is not in the head" (Varela, 1999: 72) and then "whatever you call an object ... is entirely 
dependent on this constant sensory motor handling". Therefore, an object is never independently “out there”, 
but "arises because of your activity, so, in fact, you and the object are co-emerging, co-arising" (Varela, 1999: 
71-72). In conclusion, the “organism and environment enfold into each other and unfold from one another in 
the fundamental circularity that is life itself” (Varela et al., 1991: 217). 
 
Accordingly, also recent neuroscientific theories have suggested that perception and cognition are 
fundamentally shaped by the body (Barsalou, 2008; Gallagher, 2005; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Proffitt, 
2006).  A good starting point to face this concept of minimal or “core self” (Damasio, 1999; Rochat, 
2004; Zahavi, 2005) is by focusing on the notion of body ownership, conceived as the feeling that our 
body parts belong to us. Both philosophy (Husserl, 1936, 1931; Merleau-Ponty, 1962) and natural 
sciences (Head & Holmes, 1911; Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2010; 2011) explain what body ownership is by 
referring to two fundamental concepts: body schema and body image. The first one is a 
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representational model of the body, built upon bottom-up processes, which provides a standard 
reference for both posture and movement (Head & Holmes, 1911; Gallagher, 1998). This model 
results from previous sensory-motor experiences, mainly involving the sense of proprioception, but 
also tactile and vestibular input (Berlucchi & Aglioti, 1997; 2010; Maravita et al., 2003), as well as 
motor control. It has also been argued that the body schema is nothing more than the implicit 
knowledge we have about our bodies, primarily composed by sensory-motor skills and habits: 
“We have a sense of the body in what it accomplishes. I have a tacit sense of the space that I am in 
(whether it is crowded, whether it is wide open, or whether it is closing in). Likewise, I have a 
proprioceptive sense of whether I am sitting or standing, stretching or contracting my muscles. Of 
course, these postural and positional senses of where and how the body is tending to remain in the 
background of my awareness; they are tacit, recessive. They are what phenomenologists call a “pre-
reflective sense of myself as embodied” (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008, p.139).  
 
A first description of this sub-component of bodily experience has been provided by the founder of 
phenomenology, Edmund Husserl. He named the body schema as leib, the body-subject, lived from 
inside, which recalls the subjective experience of the body from the first-person perspective. 
Accordingly, neuroscientists describe the body schema as intrinsically linked to voluntary action: it 
is updated during action, and also supports well-organized, smooth action by providing a 
proprioceptive representation of the initial conditions for the movement (Ghezet al, 1995; Sainburg 
et al, 1993; Tsakiris 2010). On the other hand, body image is defined as an explicit mental 
representation of our body, built upon top-down processes, which consist in a conscious belief about 
our body in terms of dimension, shape and specific features (Longo, 2009), and implies also the 
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emotional feeling towards it (Slade, 1988; Cash and Brown, 1987; Gardner and Moncrieff, 1988; 
Powers et al, 1987). Husserl captures the notion of body image as korper, the body-object observed 
from outside, which is the experience of our body from a third person perspective (Drummond, 
2007). The continuous interface between these two aspects is responsible for the appearance of 
body ownership (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Correspondingly, cognitive neuroscientists report that the 
interactions between bottom-up and top-down components are a necessary condition for the 
appearance of the body ownership (Tsakiris, 2010). These processes, which take place in 
multisensory associative brain areas (Blanke et al., 2015), define ourselves as having a certain body 
distinct from the other objects of the world. In this last essential interplay, a fundamental process 
that underlines our conscious experience to own a body is indicated as embodiment, which 
corresponds to a specific type of information processing of perceptual, motor and cognitive 
conditions for a body part to be experienced as one’s own (de Vignemont, 2011). This term has been 
introduced to replace the classical theory proposed by Decartes, which postulated a separation 
between the mind (res cogitans) and the body (res extensa). By contrast, in a neuro-
phenomenological perspective, every cognitive experience, from perceptual-motor behavior to 
human reasoning, arises through the concurrent participation of several functionally distinct and 
topographically distributed regions of the brain and their sensorimotor embodiment (Varela et al. 
2001). According to Gallagher & Zahavi, “it just is an empirical fact that we are indeed embodied, 
that our perceptions and actions depend on the fact that we have bodies, and that cognition is shaped 
by our bodily existence” (2008, p 131). To summarize, body ownership is a complex conscious 
phenomenon, composed by distinct aspect of our body perception: an unconscious body schema, a 
conscious body image, and a dynamic relationship between the two captured by the process of 
embodiment. At this point, a fundamental issue urges to be addressed: where are the boundaries 
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between us and the world? Alva Noe claims that there is no reason to believe that our bodies end 
where we usually think: “parts of me, such as tools, can be physically separated from my body; what 
makes it part of me is the way in which they are involved in my actions” (2010). The possibility to 
execute an action, intrinsic feature of our body schema, can shape the way in which we represent 
ourselves with respect to the environment in which we act (Thompson & Rosch, 2001). When we 
use a pen, a tong or a rake, it is as though the tool has become part of ourselves; the process and 
experience of embodiment highlights the plasticity of the self, extremely dynamic, in constant 
development with the environment in which it is situated (Maturana & Varela, 1987).  
In the last thirty years, the concept that our conscious belief to possess a body is not something rigid 
and fixed from our birth, but is rather constantly taking shape in the mutual interaction with the 
environment (which recalls what James (1890) tried to capture with the expression “flow of 
experience”), has started to gain recognition also in basic neuroscience. Intracranial 
electrophysiology studies have identified several fronto-parietal networks responsible for the 
integration of information from specific body regions and external space, and shown how such 
integration is functionally relevant to specific actions performed by specific body parts (Colby, 1998; 
Rizzolatti et al., 1997, 1998; Graziano & Gross, 1998; Jeannerod et al., 1995). Those neurons are 
named bimodal neurons because they respond both to somatosensory information from a specific 
body part and to visual information from the space adjacent to it (Graziano et al., 1994; Fogassi et 
al., 1996; Duhamel et al., 1996). Moreover, the visual receptive field of bimodal neurons remains 
anchored to the body segment when this moves in space; therefore, it has been proposed that this 
system may be crucial for coding action space in body-centered coordinates (Colby, 1998; Graziano 
& Gross, 1998; Ladavas, 2002). It is now well accepted that these areas of integration of multisensory 
signals (visual, somatosensory and, in the case of trimodal neurons, also auditory) constitute the 
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neural substrate coding for peripersonal space (PPS). For example, for the hand PPS is defined as the 
“hand reaching space”, immediately surrounding the body, in which objects can be grasped and 
manipulated (Di Pellegrino & Ladavas, 2015). It has been shown that bimodal neurons anchored to 
the monkey's face expand their receptive fields when a stimulus approaching the animal’s face 
increases its speed motion (Fogassi et al., 1996). Similarly, a very elegant experiment by Iriki, Tanaka 
and Iwamura (1996) has shown that visual receptive fields of bimodal (visuo-tactile) neurons of the 
macaque’ posterior parietal cortex, active during hand movements, can be modified by actions 
which involve use of tools. After having trained monkeys to retrieve pieces of food with a small rake, 
the researchers noticed that during active tool use the receptive visual fields anchored to the 
monkey’s hand become large enough to include the space around both hand and rake. In animals 
that handled the rake for the same amount of time but without the training for purposeful use the 
receptive fields maintained their usual extension (Figure 1.1 and 1.2). 
 
  
  
13 
 
 
FIG 1.1. Changes in bimodal receptive field properties following tool-use. The somatosensory receptive fields (sRF) of cells in this 
region were identified by light touches, passive manipulation of joints or active hand-use. The visual RF (vRF) was defined as the area 
in which cellular responses were evoked by visual probes. (a) sRF (blue area) of the ‘distal type’ bimodal neurons and their vRF (pink 
areas) (b) before tool-use, (c) immediately after tool use, and (d) when just passively grabbing the rake. (e) sRF (blue area) of ‘proximal 
type’ bimodal neurons, and their vRF (pink areas) (f) before and (g) immediately after tool-use. (Image and caption adopted from 
Maravita e Iriki, 2004).  
 
 
 
FIG 1.2. Expansion’ of the hand-centered visual receptive fields of macaque monkey area 2 & 5 (anterior /medial bank IPS) neurons’. 
In a) monkey grasp food using the hand, in b) using a rake (receptive field become larger) (Image adopted from Iriki, Tanaka, Iwamura, 
1996). 
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This physiological result is taken as evidence supporting the dynamic property of spatial 
representations: the instrument used to perform an action was included in the animal’s body 
schema, which was expanded accordingly; as a consequence, the space that was previously coded 
as “far” by the bimodal neurons, after training is processed as “near” space, thanks to the dynamic 
extension of their receptive fields determined by the use of the tool. 
A reshaping of similar spatial maps has also been observed in humans by studying a 
neuropsychological syndrome called unilateral spatial neglect. Neglect is a very complex and multi-
faceted disease, mainly resulting from focal lesions of fronto-parietal circuits in the right 
hemisphere, often of ischemic origin, and entailing a deficit of awareness of space contralateral to 
the lesion (Marshall & Robertson, 2013). Berti & Frassinetti (2000) have analyzed the behavior of a 
patient who showed more severe neglect in PPS then in far space (out of hand reaching) and that, 
when asked to indicate the midpoint of lines designed on a sheet of paper, showed the usual 
rightward bias when performing with a laser pen the line bisection task, but not when pointing the 
laser pen in the far space. Interestingly, when the patient performed the task in the far space with a 
long wand allowing her to physically reach the line, the classical rightward bias re-emerged. The tool-
use literally made the far space become near, possibly by extending the PPS to incorporate the wand 
in it (Berti & Frassinetti, 2010). The opposite remapping direction (the near space becoming far) has 
also been described. Neppi-Mòdona et al. (2007) observed that when using a laser pen (a tool that 
does not involve sensory continuity with the target) in line bisection tasks, patients remapped the 
near space as far; in this condition, the neglect bias in the near space became as severe as in the far 
space. This evidence suggests that processing the space as near implies a continuity between the 
instrument and the object, otherwise, the lack of visual, tactile and proprioceptive feedback from 
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the same instrument in the far space, point to a representation of the space as far (Neppi-Mòdona 
et al., 2007).  
Evidences for a dynamic representation of body-in-space are also described in healthy subjects. 
Sposito and colleagues (2012), investigating to what extent the somatosensory representation of the 
body may be susceptible to remapping processes due to tool use, reported that participants, after a 
tool-use task, indicated the midpoint position of their limb (identified through tactile stimulation) 
more distal with respect to the pre-training measurement. This result has been widely replicated 
and is in line with the hypothesis of an extension of the body representation caused by the use of 
the tool (Cardinali et al, 2009; Iriki et al, 1996; Maravita et al, 2002; Costantini et al., 2011).  A likely 
interpretation on the data is that the extension of the scope for action was critical in determining an 
extension of the internal representation of the length of the arm. Overall, these results indicate the 
existence of a deep relationship between body schema, action execution and space representation, 
brought about by multisensory and motor processing within the same associative brain areas, which 
provides the interface between perception and action (Brozzoli et al., 2012).  
 
1.2 Body ownership alteration following brain injuries. 
In the previous sections we have seen that a normal interaction with the world implies the implicit 
notion that the body executing actions in space is mine. Moreover, this conscious experience to own 
a body is constructed also on the contribution of a specific sensory-motor network responsible for 
coding space in a body-centered reference frame. But what happens when the sense of body 
ownership is dramatically altered as, for instance, after brain damage? In brain-damaged patients 
with motor and somatosensory impairments, body awareness can be pathologically altered. In some 
cases, patients may feel a sense of dis-ownership towards their contralesional limbs, because they 
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are felt as separated from their own body. Moreover, the feeling of strangeness may result in the 
delusional belief that the contralesional limbs do not belong to one's own body but to another 
person; this is the case of somatopharafrenia (Garcin et al, 1938; Gerstmann, 1942; Vallar and 
Ronchi, 2009; Romano et al., 2014). The lesional pattern recently associated with 
somatoparaphrenia reveals the function of a complex and distributed right fronto–temporo–parietal 
network extending to subcortical structures (Gandola et al., 2012), and to the insula (Karnath et al., 
2010). In other cases, a more complex denial process of body parts may appear as a symptom 
resulting from injury of fronto-parietal cortex. This condition, called misoplegia from the greek 
"aversion to them" (Critcley, 1974; Moro et al., 2004), comprehends a dislike or hatred of one’s own 
paralyzed limb, with verbal aggression towards it, and also including physical acts such as striking 
and beating the hemiplegic extremity (Loetscher et al., 2006). To enhance the complexity of this 
picture another syndrome, indicated as xenomelia, the “foreign limb syndrome” or “body integrity 
identity disorder” (BIID) has been described, characterized by the non-acceptance of one or more of 
one’s own extremities and the resulting desire for elective limb amputation or paralysis (Brugger et 
al., 2013; Hilti et al., 2013). Interestingly, it has recently been shown that these patients have reduced 
cortical thickness and dimension in the superior parietal lobule and reduced cortical surface area in 
the inferior parietal lobule, somatosensory areas SI and SII, anterior insular cortex, and frontal 
operculum (Hilti et al., 2013). Crucially, all the described syndromes have in common the alteration 
of several fronto-parietal networks involved in multisensory integration processes, which make 
these areas the best candidate as the neural counterpart of a coherent sense of body ownership. 
The majority of such body ownership disorders results in a disruption of the continuity of the self, 
which entails patients to refuse the ownership of a portion of their body which they don’t physically 
feel as their own anymore. The possibility of the existence of an opposite behavior (patients who 
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mis-identify other people's limbs as their own) has rarely been considered. However, in recent 
studies (Garbarini et al., 2012; 2013a, 2014; Garbarini and Pia, 2013; Pia et al., 2013a), this behavior 
has been observed in a sample of patients who claimed that the examiner's left hand was their own 
whenever it was positioned, in egocentric coordinates, next to their left hand. Patients with this 
delusion of ownership, called pathological embodiment, don’t deny their contralesional limbs (as in 
the somatoparaphrenic delusion of disownership) and treat the experimenter's left arm as if it is 
their own (see Chapter 2 for a more detailed description). Previous studies demonstrated that the 
pathological embodiment reflects a high-order cognitive mechanisms capable of altering the 
patients’ sensory-motor functions. For example, using a modified version of the bimanual circle-line 
task, patients were asked to draw lines with their right hand (healthy) while watching an alien left 
hand draw circles in egocentric position, congruent with the patient's body image (condition in which 
the incorporation phenomenon occurs). They showed a significant interference effects of the alien 
arm movements on the actual movements of their own intact arm, resulting in a clear coupling effect 
as that observed in healthy control (Garbarini et al., 2013).  Moreover, when painful stimuli were 
delivered to the alien embodied hand, patients referred to feel pain on it (Pia et al., 2013a) and 
showed coherent physiological skin conductance reactions, as if the own hand was stimulated 
(Garbarini et al., 2014). These results show how parts of the body belonging to other individuals may 
be, at least in pathological conditions, so deeply integrated in patients’ sensory-motor system to 
generate intense sensory experiences such as those experienced on their real limbs.  
In Chapter 2 we asked whether this altered sense of body ownership, i.e. pathological embodiment, 
can modulate both intentional motor processes and the spatial extension of the own body 
representation. In particular, we investigated the effects of the observation of an alien arm (which 
was pathologically embodied by patients) performing a tool-use training (grasp-to-place task) on the 
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representation-size of own forearm. The crucial aspect of this experiment is that we expected 
patients to truly believe to be actually performing the task with their own arm and, consequently, to 
show an overestimation of their forearm length in the post-training phase with respect to the pre-
training phase. According to previous evidences (Sposito et al., 2012; Cardinali et al, 2009; Iriki et al, 
1996; Maravita et al, 2002; Costantini et al., 2011), we expected to find an overestimation of the 
forearm length in a control group of healthy subjects (Experiment 1) only after active tool-use 
training, and the same effect in patients only when they pathologically embodied the alien arm 
performing the task (Experiment 2).  Results in this direction would strongly support the view that 
the sense of body ownership extends to intentional motor processes but also modulates the sensory 
map of action-related body parts even in absence of active performed movement (in patients with 
pathological embodiment).  
 
1.3 Body ownership alteration following experimental manipulation: the case of the rubber hand 
illusion.  
The results presented so far show that bodily experiences must be understood in light of a 
multimodal representation of the body. It has been proposed that multisensory integration, together 
with internal models of the body, modulate the experience of the body as being one’s own, as well 
as the demarcation or distinction between one’s body and other objects (Tsakiris et al., 2010). Under 
normal circumstances, body schema and body image together form a consistent basis for self-
consciousness. On the other hand, in unusual circumstances such as brain damage (see chapter 2) 
or multisensory illusions in healthy subjects (see chapter 3), the sense of body ownership can be 
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altered or manipulated (Gallagher and Cole, 1995; Paillard, 1999; Rossetti et al, 1995; Costantini and 
Haggard, 2007).  
The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is an experimental paradigm that allows controlled manipulation of 
the experience of the feeling to own a body, and provides an incredible evidence for plasticity of 
embodiment. It has been shown that watching a rubber hand (RH) being stroked synchronously with 
one’s own unseen hand is sufficient to produce a feeling of ownership over the fake hand (Botvinick 
and Cohen 1998). Briefly, during this experimental manipulation, participants see a rubber hand 
aligned in a similar orientation to their actual, unseen right hand (Figure 1.3). In the synchronous 
condition, the two hands (rubber and real hidden one) are touched at the same time with identical 
brushes at identical locations. For many participants, this visuo-tactile match generates the 
compelling feeling that the rubber hand really is their hand (i.e., the sense of ownership). In the 
asynchronous condition, in contrast, the two hands are touched at different times, eliminating the 
multisensory match between vision and touch and the participant’s feeling of ownership over the 
rubber hand. The subjective feeling of ownership over the rubber hand is measured with a 
questionnaire which evaluate the subjects’ vividness of illusion using items like: “It seemed as if I 
were feeling the touch in the location where I saw the rubber hand touched”, “It seemed as though 
the touch I felt was caused by the touch over the rubber hand”, “I felt as if the rubber hand were my 
hand”. In the synchronous condition subjects tend to highly agree with those statements (but not in 
the asynchronous control condition). Moreover, when participants are asked to localize the 
perceived position of their unseen hand (for instance, by pointing with the opposite hand or by 
indicating a number on a ruler), they misjudged their real hand’s location significantly more towards 
the RH; this behavioral component, named proprioceptive drift, is a multimodal measure which 
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combines the processing of visual, tactile, and proprioceptive information and suggest that, after the 
instauration of the illusion, the subject’s hand-centered reference frame shifts towards the fake 
hand. In sum, the RHI has two behavioral components: reported feeling of ownership over the RH 
(questionnaire rating) and changing in the felt position of the real hidden hand towards the RH 
(proprioceptive drift). This illusion does not occur when the RH is stroked asynchronously with 
respect to the participant’s own hand (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed description). It has been 
proposed that RHI causes a multisensory conflict between touch, vision and proprioception, which 
is resolved by the brain through the instauration of the illusion: the felt tactile sensation (from the 
real hidden hand) is coherently perceived coming from the location in which is seen (over the RH). 
Interestingly, the prevalence of the illusion over time (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998) and the subjective 
experience of intensity degree of illusion (Longo et al., 2008) are positively correlated with changes 
in the position of the real hand felt against the RH (the more illusory experience of ownership the 
higher the proprioceptive drift). Manipulation of the sense of body ownership during the RHI has 
been widely replicated (Armel and Ramachandran, 2003; Ehrsson et al.2004; Longo et al, 2008; 
Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris et al, 2007; Kammers et al., 2008) and this procedure is well 
accepted as a tool to investigate the body ownership, since it creates a temporary condition in which 
an external object becomes part of the subject’s body (Tsakiris, 2010).  
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FIG. 1.3. A canonical setup to elicit the rubber hand illusion. (Image and caption adopted from Kammers et al., 2008). 
 
However, intermodal matching per se is not sufficient to elicit the illusion; physical and postural 
similarities of the RH with the real hand constrain the integration between vision and touch, i.e. the 
RH must be positioned in an anatomically correct position with respect to the shoulder and the body 
image (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Costantini and Haggard, 2007). Haggard and colleagues 
manipulated posture (congruent with egocentric coordinates or not) of the viewed RH and identity 
of the viewed object (RH vs wooden stick) and found that RHI occurred only when the RH was in a 
congruent posture or of a congruent identity with respect to the participant’s hand. Moreover, 
incongruent RH posture and identity, and neutral objects did not elicit proprioceptive drifts. 
According with the body gestalts, the RHI occurred only when participants viewed a congruent RH 
that was stimulated synchronously with their own hand. The authors concluded that the anatomical 
and postural correspondence between the part of the body visually stimulated (RH) and the one 
tactile stimulated (real hidden hand) is a necessary condition for the emergence of ownership over 
the RH (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Costantini and Haggard, 2007). Other experimental evidences 
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confirm that RHI is not induced when a non-corporeal object, such as a wooden stick, replaces the 
RH (Tsakiris et al, 2008; Armel and Ramachandran, 2003). In sum, during the RHI, two main 
component of the embodiment of the RH are successfully influenced: the sense of ownership over 
the RH and the bias in the perceived position of the participant’ real hand. Which are the 
mechanisms on which this phenomenon relies? It has been proposed that the embodiment process 
depends on a combined bottom-up match between visual stimulation of the RH and tactile 
stimulation of the subject’s hidden hand (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris, 2010). Furthermore, 
the incorporation depends on the corresponding match between visual image of the RH and current 
representations that the subject has of his own body, consisting of at least one body schema 
(proprioceptive) and one body image (visual) (Tsakiris, 2010). These last matching processes may be 
called top-down, since they depend on an internal mental representation rather than by a current 
of afferent sensory input. At this point we should try to describe what changes in the subjects’ bodily 
experience during the RHI. One possibility is that the RH is simply added as a third limb, with no real 
impact on the experience of our own hands. Alternatively, the rubber hand can "really" replace the 
hand of the participant and, in turn, alter his/her body experience (Tsakiris, 2010). Subjective reports 
and behavioral observations suggest that the rubber hand is not simply added as a third part, but 
instead replaces the real hand, both in terms of phenomenal experience and physiological regulation 
(Tsakiris, 2010). In a study proposing a psychometric approach to the body ownership, participants 
have denied that they felt like they had three hands, while they openly expressed that they felt as if 
their own hand had disappeared (Longo et al., 2008). Furthermore, subjects showed stronger skin 
conductance reactions when the fake arm was “injured” after synchronous stimulation compared to 
asynchronous stimulation (Armel and Ramachandran, 2003).  Additionally, it has been demonstrated 
that self-generated movement produces a different kind of body awareness than purely afferent 
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signals, so that the active body is experienced as more coherent and unified than the passive body 
(Gallagher, 2005; Tsakiris et al., 2006). In conclusion, executing an action (whether passively or 
actively) plays an important role in the sense of ownership and, more in general, in self-bodily 
consciousness (Tsakiris et al., 2010). This last evidence suggests the idea that the awareness of 
oneself, as bodily-self, emerges from the experience of oneself as agentive (Gallese & Sinigalia, 2010; 
2011). All together these findings suggest that RHI cause a real incorporation and substitution of the 
real hand and that sense of ownership results from the localization of the tactile property within a 
body representation constructed on the basis of the information that is available to the subject (e.g. 
vision, touch and proprioception for most of the people) (Tsakiris, 2010). So, it is quite clear that 
without multimodal interaction, the phenomenon of the rubber hand would not have been possible.  
Several studies have attempted to identify the neural correlate of RHI experience, using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) (Ehrsson et al, 2004; Ehrsson et al, 2005). It has been suggested 
that the embodiment of the RH depends on a correspondence between the “seen” and “felt” of the 
body part concerned. The ventral premotor cortex (vPM), anatomically connected to visual and 
somatosensory areas in the posterior parietal cortex and to the frontal motor areas (Rizzolatti et al., 
1998; Graziano, 1999; Makin et al., 2008), is a reasonable location where all these different aspects 
contributing to the RHI could be integrated. Premotor neurons receive information about both the 
proprioceptive and visual representations of the hand position (Graziano et al., 1994; Lloyd, 2003), 
and in fact they discharge when the hand is touched or when a visual stimulus is presented near it 
(Graziano et al., 1994, Rizzolatti et al., 1981; Fogassi et al., 1996). Therefore, it is plausible to assume 
that the activity of the vPM reflects the detection of congruent multisensory signals related to one’s 
own body parts, which in turn could be responsible for the feeling of body ownership. But, even if 
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electrophysiological studies show that the position of the limb can be computed in this area based 
on multi-sensory information, they cannot inform us about whether and how its activity is linked to 
the conscious experience of owning a limb. Ehrsson and colleagues (2004) provided the first 
functional evidence in support of the hypothesis that the feeling to own a body depends on 
multisensory integration processes (Figure 1.4), showing an increased activation in the left premotor 
cortex after the subjects indicated that the illusion had begun. Furthermore, there was a linear 
correlation between the subjective evaluation of illusion (questionnaire rating) and the level of 
neural activity in the vPM cortex. These results support the hypothesis that neural activity in these 
regions is correlated with the emergence of the feeling to own a body-part and provides evidence 
to believe that activity in this area is deeply associated with the subjective experience that the body 
one sees belongs to oneself (Ehrsson et al, 2004; Ehrsson et al, 2005; Berti et al., 2005; Arzy et al., 
2006). However, the conscious experience to own a body is a high-order experience which goes 
beyond the functionality of a single area, but relies on the whole system. In fact, before the illusion 
began, it has also been found increased levels of activity in extra-striate areas, in the bilateral 
intraparietal cortex, in bilateral dorsal premotor cortex and supplementary motor area, as well as 
the left side of the cerebellum, in the left putamen, and in the left ventral thalamic nucleus (Ehrsson 
et al, 2004; Ehrsson et al, 2005). Furthermore, a significant relationship between the activity of the 
right side of the cerebellum and the strength of the illusion was described (Ehrsson et al, 2004; 
Ehrsson et al, 2005). This evidences suggest that a great number of cerebral motor network are 
relevant in the emergence of the conscious experience to own an active body; in light of these 
findings, the premotor cortex, given its anatomy-functional properties, instead of the hot spot, could 
be conceptualized as a very relevant site of a wider and distributed sensory-motor system, of which 
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all the component, at different level of complexity, contribute with the emergence of body 
ownership. 
 
 
 
FIG 1.4. Bilateral premotor activity that reflects the rubber hand illusion. The activation peaks are located in the inferior part of the 
precentral sulcus. R denotes right; coordinates in standard space are indicated at lower left. (Image and caption adopted from Ehrsson 
et al., 2004). 
 
We saw that impairment of the network implicated in multisensory integration could reflect in body 
ownership disorder (Garcin et al, 1938; Gerstmann, 1942; Vallar and Ronchi, 2009; Romano et al., 
2014; Gandola et al., 2012; Karnath et al., 2010; Critcley, 1974; Moro et al., 2004; Loetscher et al., 
2006; Brugger et al., 2013; Hilti et al., 2013). Moreover, in most of those cases (except for xenomelia, 
in which primary sensory-motor functionality seems spared), patients always suffered of primary 
sensory-motor deficit (hemeplegia and/or hemianestisia), suggesting that a normal functioning of 
those brain areas is a necessary condition to experience our body as owned by us. At the same time, 
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during the RHI, a similar phenomenon has been described: subjects report a feeling of dis-ownership 
over the deluded hand (Longo, 2008) and it has been shown that skin temperature of the real hand 
decreases when they take ownership of an artificial counterpart (Moosley et al., 2008; Kammers et 
al., 2012; Rohde et al., 2013). The recorded drop in skin temperature is the first physiological 
correlate of the RHI and supports the idea that conscious sense self, and physiological regulation of 
the physical self are mutually linked.  
This and other similar evidence is starting to suggest that body awareness and more in general of 
self-awareness, are built on the continuous sensory-motor interaction between self and the 
environment (Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Varela, 2000; Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011) and on the activity of 
multisensory brain areas (Ehrsson et al., 2004; 2005; Blanke et al., 2015). In other words, 
representations of the body continuously interact with sense of agency, allowing human beings to 
experience themselves as agent on the basis of the congruence between self-generated movements 
and their expected consequences (Tsakiris et al., 2007; Gallese & Sinigaglia 2010; 2011; Gallagher & 
Zahavi, 2009; Jeannerod, 2007). Nevertheless, the contribution of sensory-motor system in 
generating the body ownership is still not completely understood. 
In Chapter 3, we directly address this issue by asking whether and how the subjective and sometime 
illusory sense of body ownership interacts with objective measures of the sensory-motor system. 
We combined the RHI paradigm with transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) in order to study the 
interaction between body awareness and motor control, with the aim of providing a physiological 
motor counterpart of the body ownership alteration, as that occurring during the RHI. In a sample 
of healthy subjects, we investigated the modulation of the real hand parameters during RHI from a 
motor point of view, hypothesizing that a disembodiment of the real (deluded) hand during the RHI 
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might be measurable as a decrease in readiness to move the hand, reflected in a lower excitability 
of its motor pathways. During Experiment 1, subjects were tested in two visual-tactile stimulation 
conditions: synchronous and asynchronous. MEPs were elicited by a TMS single-pulse of the hand 
area in the left primary motor cortex (M1) and recorded from the first dorsal interosseous muscle 
(FDI) of the right hand. In Experiment 2 (control) we replicated the same procedure, but recording 
from the left FDI, in order to verify that the physiological modulation was specific for the hand 
subject to the RHI. Behavioral results showed the expected well described effect of the RHI in the 
synchronous compared to the asynchronous condition (feeling of ownership towards the RH, feeling 
of dis-ownership towards the deluded hand, proprioceptive drift towards the RH). Physiological 
results showed a decrease in MEP amplitude in the synchronous condition (in which subjects 
experienced the illusion), while MEPs in the asynchronous condition were of comparable amplitude 
to MEPs recorded in the baseline. This study provides the first physiological evidence that the feeling 
of disembodiment of the real hand during the RHI is accompanied by a significant drop in motor 
excitability recorded in M1. These results contribute to the theoretical understanding of the link 
between body awareness and movement, suggesting that motor readiness and sense of body 
ownership are strongly linked, i.e. that bodily awareness depends on the possibility of movement. 
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Chapter 2 
When your arm becomes mine: Pathological embodiment of alien limbs using tools modulates 
own body representation 
2.1 Introduction 
When we interact with the world around us, spatial, motor and bodily representations contribute, 
in different ways, to the conscious experience of the self as an acting body. We can relate this normal 
bodily experience to the classical concept of “body schema”, firstly described by Head and Holmes 
(1911) as an un-conscious, bottom-up, dynamic representation relying on proprioceptive 
information from the muscles, joints and skin. Considering the motor nature of body schema, a 
fundamental issue to be clarified is the relationship between body schema and motor and spatial 
cognition. Head and Holmes suggested that the nature of body schema is not only sensory-motor 
but also “action-oriented”, in the sense that the possibility of action execution, intrinsic to the body 
function, can modulate how we represent the spatial extension of our body with respect to the 
external world (Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2010). Action execution, in turn, takes place in “action space” 
which can be coded as “near” or “far” relative to the acting body. Near (peripersonal) and far 
(extrapersonal) space are behaviorally defined as the space within and beyond hand reach, 
respectively (Berti and Frassinetti, 2000). This definition is based upon both neurophysiological 
evidence in the monkey and behavioral, PET and TMS evidence in humans showing that near and far 
space representations in the brain are anatomo-functionally dissociated. In the monkey, near space 
seems to be represented in frontal area 6 and in the rostral part of the inferior parietal lobe, area 7b 
and area VIP (Colby et al., 1993), whereas far space is apparently coded in area 8 and area LIP (Colby 
et al., 1996). Behavioral (Berti and Frassinetti, 2000; Maravita et al., 2003; Farné et al., 2007), PET 
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(Weiss et al., 2000) and TMS (Lane et al., 2013) studies in humans have confirmed this dissociation. 
Furthermore, recent findings indicate that near and far space representations are not to be 
considered as static concepts, but as dynamic entities: for example, active tool-use can reshape one's 
own body schema, remapping near space to include the tool used to reach for objects located in far 
space (Maravita and Iriki, 2004, for a review). In the monkey, it has been shown that the area of 
visual receptive fields (vRFs) of bimodal visuo-tactile parietal neurons (known to map the subject's 
peripersonal space) can be modified by actions performed with tools (Iriki et al., 1996; Ishibashi et 
al., 2000). Indeed, the vRFs anchored to the paw were shown to encompass the entire length of the 
tool used to reach food located in far space, as if the tool held by the animal's hand were 
incorporated into the body schema. A number of studies in humans – both in brain-damaged and in 
healthy participants – have shown similar changes following practice to reach far visual stimuli with 
a tool. It has been shown that reaching with a tool a far ipsilesional target may increase the saliency 
of that stimulus so as to increase extinction of a contralesional tactile stimulus in patients affected 
by cross-modal extinction (di Pellegrino et al., 1997; see also Farnè and Ladavas, 2000; Farnè et al., 
2005). Several line-bisection studies on patients with selective neglect for near or for far space 
indicated that tool use can reduce or increase neglect according to the sector of space within or 
outside reaching distance where the lines are positioned (Ackroyd et al., 2002; Berti and Frassinetti, 
2000; Neppi-Mòdona et al., 2007; Pegna et al., 2001). Interestingly, such a dynamical spatial 
remapping was modulated not only by visual and somatosensory feedbacks, but also by the modality 
of execution. For example, if the context required a pointing action (usually executed in far space), 
a far space representation was activated; if the context required a reaching action (usually executed 
in near space), near space was activated irrespective of the absolute spatial position of the object. 
Note that in this case the extension of body schema was modulated by the intentional action 
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executed. In healthy subjects, it has been shown that the progressive increase in line bisection errors 
with increasing stimulus distance was abolished if participants used, instead of a laser pointer, a long 
stick to reach objects in far space (Longo and Luorenco, 2006). It has been also documented that 
tool-use may increase the impact of a visual distractor on tactile discrimination (Holmes et al., 2008; 
Maravita et al., 2002a, 2002b). More importantly for the present study, a number of studies 
suggested that the modulatory effect of tool-use in space coding may be accompanied by a parallel 
change in the representations of body metrics (e.g., Bonifazi et al., 2007; Farné et al., 2007; Maravita 
and Driver, 2004). This hypothesis has been confirmed in a recent study (Sposito et al., 2012) 
showing that, in healthy subjects, active tool-use modulates the representation of related body 
parts; i.e. after tool-use training, participants showed an increased representation of the length of 
the arm handling the tool. Taken together, these findings indicate a relationship between body 
schema, action execution and space representation and that body schema is better conceptualized 
as the neurocognitive result of implicit sensory monitoring for action in a dynamic space. Although 
viewed as an unconscious representation, body schema is tightly linked to the representation of 
both intentional processes and spatial coding, contributing in fundamental ways to the emergence 
of the conscious experience of the self as an acting body in the space. A normal interaction with the 
world implies the implicit notion that the body executing actions in the space is mine (not yours, not 
others), i.e. it implies a normal sense of body ownership. But what happens when the sense of body 
ownership is dramatically altered as, for instance, after a brain damage? In brain-damaged patients 
with motor and somatosensory impairments, body awareness can be pathologically altered. In some 
cases, patients may feel a sense of strangeness towards their contralesional limbs felt as separated 
from their own body. The more frequent manifestation of this disorder is characterized by a sense 
of disownership, which is the delusional belief that the contralesional limbs do not belong to one's 
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own body but to another person (a disturbance called somatoparaphrenia: Vallar and Ronchi, 2009; 
Gandola et al., 2012; Romano et al., 2014). The possibility of the existence of an opposite behavior, 
i.e. patients who misidentify other people's limbs as their own, has been rarely considered. However, 
in recent studies (Garbarini et al., 2013a, 2014; Garbarini and Pia, 2013; Pia et al., 2013a), this 
behavior has been observed in a sample of patients, who, while not explicitly denying that their 
contralesional (left) limbs belonged to themselves (as in the somatoparaphrenic delusion of 
disownership), claimed that the examiner's left hand was their own whenever it was positioned, in 
egocentric coordinates, next to their left hand. This delusion of ownership, which we called 
“pathological embodiment”, although resembling the “rubber-hand-illusion” (Botvinick and Cohen, 
1998), was spontaneous and not induced by any experimental procedure. Patients treated and cared 
for the experimenter's left arm as if it was their own, showing a consistent embodiment of the alien 
hand in their own body schema (because of this behavior, we named them “E+” patients). 
Interestingly, this phenomenon occurs only when the alien hand is located in a position coherent 
with the patients’ higher-order and pre-existing body representation. It is important to consider that 
in E+ patients the pathological embodiment occurs only when the alien arm is in egocentric 
coordinates and it is aligned with the patients’ contralesional shoulder, exactly where it is expected 
to be. If the position of the alien arm is misaligned with respect to the patient's shoulder, the 
pathological embodiment does not occur and patients correctly discriminate their own arm/hand 
from the alien arm/hand (see Section 2.2.2.2 for details of how the embodiment is evaluated). 
Previous studies stressed the crucial role of the alignment of the alien arm with the shoulder in 
determining embodiment phenomena during the rubber hand illusion. Pavani et al. (2000) have 
shown that the illusion effect disappears when the fake hand is misaligned with respect to the 
subject's shoulder (see also Costantini and Haggard 2007, where stimulation and posture of both the 
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real and the fake hand were manipulated, and Lloyd (2007), where the effect of proximity between 
the fake and the real hand was investigated). Accordingly, Farnè et al. (2007) described, in right-
brain damaged patients, a left tactile extinction following visual stimulation of a right rubber hand. 
Interestingly, this cross-modal extinction was only evident when the rubber hand was aligned with 
the patients’ shoulder; on the contrary, when the rubber hand was misaligned with respect to the 
patients’ shoulder, cross-modal extinction was strongly reduced. Critically for the present study, the 
pathological embodiment occurs not only with a static alien hand, but also with a moving hand: 
when the examiner moved his/her left hand, patients, to their surprise, claimed that they were 
moving their own (paralyzed) hand. Previous studies demonstrated that this phenomenon is not a 
mere verbal confabulation, but reflects a powerful cognitive mechanism capable of altering the 
patients’ motor and somatosensory functions. For example, in the motor domain, these patients 
showed significant interference effects of the alien arm movements on the actual movements of 
their own intact arm (Garbarini et al., 2013a). In the somatosensory domain, when painful stimuli 
were delivered to the alien embodied hand, patients referred to feel pain on it (Pia et al., 2013a) and 
showed coherent physiological reactions, as if the own hand was stimulated (Garbarini et al., 2014). 
In the present study we asked whether an altered sense of body ownership, as that shown in the 
delusional embodiment of alien body parts described above, can modulate both intentional motor 
processes and the spatial extension of the own body representation. As already mentioned, previous 
evidence in normal subjects has demonstrated that active tool-use modulates the representation of 
related body parts. It has been shown that participants estimate the mid-point of their forearm to 
be more distally located after a 15 min training with a 60 cm long tool, as compared to a pre training 
condition (Sposito et al., 2012). Here, we investigated the effects of the observation of an alien arm 
performing a tool-use training on the length representation of the own forearm, in both healthy 
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subjects (Experiment 1) and in brain-damaged hemiplegic patients with a pathological embodiment 
of the alien arm using the tool (Experiment 2). Healthy subjects were tested in two different 
conditions, where they were asked a) to actually perform the tool-use training with their own arm 
(Action condition) or b) to observe an alien arm (the examiner's one) performing the tool-use 
training, while holding (Observation with-tool condition) or not (Observation without-tool condition) 
a similar tool (see details in Section 2.2.1). According to Sposito et al. (2012), we expected to find an 
overestimation of the forearm length only after active tool-use training (Action condition). We were 
also interested in verifying if this overestimation effect could be induced by simply observing an alien 
arm performing the tool-use training. According to Costantini et al. (2011), a difference between the 
observation with-tool and without-tool conditions could be expected. Indeed, these authors found 
that observing tool actions may extend the representation of reaching space only when observers 
shared the same action potentialities with the agent, i.e. while holding a tool compatible with the 
goal and the spatial range of the observed action. As far as patients are concerned, in our experiment 
they were asked to try to perform the tool-use training with their own (paralyzed) limb, while the 
alien arm performed the tool-use training acting either in the E+ position, where the pathological 
embodiment systematically occurs, or in the E- position, where the embodiment does not occur (see 
details in Section 2.2.2.2). The crucial aspect of this experiment is that, although the task implied the 
observation of an alien arm performing the training (as in the Observation conditions of Experiment 
1 with normal subjects), it was proposed as an active task, where hemiplegic patients were asked to 
try to perform the required movements with their plegic arm (see details in Section 2.2.2.3). On the 
basis of data from previous studies, in the E+ condition, we expected patients to truly believe to be 
actually performing the task with their own arm and, consequently, to show an overestimation of 
their forearm length in the post-training phase with respect to the pre-training phase (similarly to 
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healthy subjects actually performing the task in the active condition). Conversely, in the E- condition, 
we expected patients to be aware of not performing the task with their own arm and, hence, to 
show different results at the bisection task. If these predictions were confirmed, this would strongly 
support the view that the sense of body ownership not only extends to intentional motor processes 
but also modulates the sensory map of action-related body parts. 
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2.2.  Materials and methods 
2.2.1. Experiment 1 
2.2.1.1. Participants 
Twenty right-handed healthy volunteers (8 females and 12 males), 57-90 years of age (mean 70.5 ± 
10.6), matched for age and educational level with the sample of brain-damaged patients involved in 
the second experiment (see Section 2.2.1), were recruited for the experiment. None of the subjects 
had a history of psychiatric or neurological disorders. All participants gave their written informed 
consent before taking part to the experimental procedure, which was approved by the ethical 
committee of the University of Turin, in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Participants 
were all naive to the experimental procedure and to the aims of the study. 
 
2.2.1.2. Experimental design 
We employed a between-subject experimental design, with a unique “Action condition” and two 
different “Observation conditions” (“With-tool” and “Without-tool”), performed by two samples of 
10 subjects each. All participants in the Action condition performed a tool-use training with their 
own arm. On the contrary, during the Observation condition participants had to stay still and observe 
the examiner's arm perform the tool-use training: half of the subjects held a similar tool in their hand 
(Observation With-tool condition); the other half did not hold any tool (Observation Without-tool 
condition). The Action and the Observation conditions were performed in two different 
experimental sessions, spaced one week from each other. Half of the participants started with the 
Action condition and the other half with the Observation condition. See details in Fig. 1A and B. 
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2.2.1.3.  Experimental procedure 
The experiment comprised three phases. Firstly, participants were blindfolded and asked to perform 
a forearm bisection task in which they had to estimate, by means of 15 pointing movements, the 
mid-point of their left forearm (pre-training phase). Secondly, they were asked to perform 15 min of 
tool-use training (in free viewing). Finally, at the end of training, they were blindfolded and asked to 
perform again the forearm bisection task (post-training phase). All participants performed the 
forearm bisection task with the right arm and the training task with the left arm (according to the 
literature, the effects of training are equally present on the dominant and on the non-dominant arm; 
Sposito et al., 2012). When we designed the Experiment 1, we chose to train the left arm because 
we were interested in matching the healthy subjects’ performance with that of E+ patients 
(Experiment 2), more frequently showing a pathological embodiment for the left side of the body. 
Given the fact that, in the Experiment 2, we recruited also one left brain-damaged patient showing 
a right limb embodiment, following the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, we additionally tested 
10 right-handed age-matched healthy subjects (5 females and 5 males; 54 - 85 years of age (mean 
68.5 ± 9.3), per-forming the active tool-use training with the right hand. The forearm bisection task 
and the tool-use training are de-scribed in detail as follows. 
Forearm bisection task. Blindfolded participants were instructed to indicate, by using their right/left 
index finger, the midpoint of their left/right distal upper limb segment comprising the forearm and 
the hand, considering the elbow and the tip of the middle finger as the two extremities. During the 
task, the forearm was kept in a radial posture and placed inside a Plexiglas parallelepiped (70x10x11 
cm3), in order to prevent any possible tactile feedback from the bisections. On the top of the screen 
above the arm was glued a paper rule with the 0-cm scale index in correspondence of the elbow, in 
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order to easily measure the position of the subjective midpoint (p). Then, in order to obtain a 
percentage score relative to each participant's subjective arm length, we used the following formula: 
[(p/arm length) 100]. The task was not a time trial and on-line corrections were not allowed. Each 
participant performed a total of 30 bisection pointing, 15 before (Pre-training) and 15 after tool-use 
training (Post-training) (Sposito et al., 2012). See details in Fig. 1A. 
Tool use training. All participants performed the task sitting at a table. In the Action condition, they 
were instructed to retrieve a number of targets by means of a garbage plier (70-cm long) and put 
them, according to the examiner's instructions, in one of two boxes located along the right or the 
left side of the table. It is important to note that only distal movements were required during the 
training phase for triggering the plier lever with the left hand and for orienting the wrist to the left 
or to the right in order to grasp targets and to put them in the requested box. Targets were different 
from each other by color (i.e. red, yellow, blue, green), shape (i.e. circle, cube, parallelepiped) and 
dimension (i.e. big or small). In the Observation condition, participants were instructed to stay still 
and to observe the examiner's left arm (in dark gray in Fig. 1B) performing the tool-use training with 
the garbage plier. They were specifically asked to focus their attention on the action performed by 
the examiner, orienting their gaze to the left or to the right, according to the location of the box 
where the examiner put the objects. The alien arm was located in a proximal position with respect 
to the participant's trunk midline. According to the group membership, participants were handling 
or not a garbage plier identical to that used by the examiner (Observation With-tool and Observation 
Without-tool conditions, respectively). See details in Fig. 1B. 
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FIG. 1. Experimental task. (A) Bisection task: schematic aerial view of the experimental setting depicting the forearm bisection 
procedure in Experiments 1 and 2; the subject's arm lied inside a translucid plexiglas parallelepiped to avoid tactile feedback. The 
numbers on top represent the paper ruler used to calculate the subjective midpoint in cm (see Section 2.1.3 for details). (B) Tool-use 
training, Experiment 1: Healthy volunteers performed the training either with their own arm (Action condition) or observing the 
examiner's arm (the dark gray one) perform the task, handling (observation with-tool condition) or not (observation without-tool 
condition) a similar tool. (C) Tool-use training, Experiment 2: with patients the training was performed by the examiner's (alien) arm 
(in dark gray). The alien arm could act (a) in a position more proximal to the patient's trunk midline (E+ condition, upper left and right 
quadrants), where embodiment occurs, or (b) in a more distal position (E condition, lower left and right quadrants), where 
embodiment does not occur and patients correctly acknowledge that the alien arm belongs to the examiner. The task was performed 
on the patients’ contralesional side. 
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2.2.1.4.  Data analysis 
In Experiment 1, the mean forearm bisection value of healthy subjects (n=20) was used as dependent 
variable. These data were entered in a 2*2*2 repeated measures ANOVA with “tool” (two levels: 
“with-tool” and “without-tool”) as between subject factor and “condition” (two levels: “action” and 
“observation”) and “training” (two levels: “pre” and “post”) as within subject factors. Planned 
comparisons were performed in order to compute the contrasts of interest. Given the fact that the 
adopted design could potentially introduce more noise in the observation conditions (where 10 
subjects performed the with-tool task and the other 10 the without-tool task) than in the action 
condition (where all 20 subjects performed the same task), we checked for the equivalence of 
variance of the active condition either vs the observation-with-tool and the observation-without-
tool condition by means of F-tests for the equivalence of variance. The F-tests were not significant 
(Active vs Observation-with-tool: p=0.63; Active vs Observation-without-tool: p=0.11), suggesting 
that the equivalence of variance can be assumed and the ANOVA run properly. As suggested by an 
anonymous reviewer, we also run an additional ANOVA to directly test the contrast Observation-
with-tool against the Observation-without-tool, ruling out the possible confound of active tool use. 
Finally, to compare the left-hand training vs the right-hand training, we performed a 2*2 ANOVA 
with “side” (two levels: “left” and “right”) as between-subject factor and “training” (two levels: “pre” 
and “post”) as within subject factor. The mean forearm bisection value of healthy subjects 
performing the left hand training (n=20) and the right-hand training (n=10) was used as dependent 
variable. The equivalence of variance of the left-hand training (n=20) vs the right-hand training 
(n=10) was checked by means of F-tests. The F-tests were not significant (p=0.43), suggesting that 
the equivalence of variance can be assumed and the ANOVA run properly. 
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2.2.2.  Experiment 2 
2.2.2.1.  Participants 
Four brain-damaged patients of cerebrovascular origin were recruited at the “San Camillo” Hospital 
(Turin, Italy). All participants gave their written informed consent before taking part to the 
experimental procedure, which was approved by the ethical committee of the ASL TO 1 of Turin and 
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki (BMJ 1991; 302: 1194). Patients were all naive to the 
experimental procedure and to the purpose of the study. They were all assessed using the following 
tests: general cognitive tests (Montreal Cognitive Assessment – MOCA or Mini Mental State 
Evaluation – MMSE); visual field exam; assessment of hemiplegia, assessment of anosognosia for 
hemiplegia, assessment of hemianesthesia; tests for extrapersonal neglect (Behavioral Inattention 
Test – BIT – conventional and behavioral subtests; DILLER) and for personal neglect (FLUFF). Patients 
were also evaluated for somatoparaphrenia (Fotopoulou et al., 2011). Exclusion criteria were: (1) 
previous neurological or psychiatric history; (2) severe general cognitive impairment (patients under 
the MMSE cut off or the MOCA cut off were excluded); 3) visual field deficit (patients with visual field 
scores higher than zero were excluded). See Table 1 for details. 
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Table 1. Patients’ demographic and clinical data. 
 
Patient E+1 E+2 E+3 E+4 
Age 50 65 72 48 
Sex F M M M 
Education 5 17 8 5 
Etiology I I I H 
Lesion side LH RH RH RH 
Months from onset 6 3 2 2 
Visual field defect 0-0 0-0 0-0 0-0 
Hemiplegia (HP) 3 2 3 3 
Anosognosia for HP 0 0 0 0 
Hemianesthesia (HAE) 3 1 2 3 
General cognitive impairment        -            -  -                  - 
Extrapersonal neglect        +   +  + 
Personal neglect        -            -  -                  - 
Somatoparaphrenia        -            -  -                  - 
 
Tab. 1. Presence of embodiment (E+) of the experimenter's arm. Sex: M=Male, F=Female. Education: years of school. Etiology: 
H=hemorrhage; I=ischemia. Lesion Side: RH=Right Hemisphere; LH=Left Hemisphere. Months from onset: number of months between 
the onset of the disease and the first assessment. For visual field defect (the two values refer to the upper and lower visual quadrants, 
respectively), hemiplegia, anosognosia for hemiplegia and hemianesthesia scores were ranged from normal (0) to severe defects (3) 
(Spinazzola et al., 2008, in press; Pia et al., 2014). General cognitive impairment (- = no deficit; + = presence of deficit): MOCA cut off 
≥ 14.5/30; MMSE cut off ≥ 24/30. Extrapersonal neglect (- = no deficit; + = presence of deficit): BIT, conventional subtests cut-off ≥ 
129/ 146; BIT behavioral subtest cut-off ≥ 67/81; DILLER cut-off omissions l – r ≥ 5. Personal neglect (- = no deficit; + = presence of 
deficit): FLUFF cut off omissions L ≤ 2. The presence/absence of somatoparaphrenia was evaluated according to Fotopoulou et al. 
(2011).  
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Patients were admitted to the study if they showed: a) contralesional upper limb hemiplegia, as 
reported by the responsible neurologist and confirmed by a motor impairment examination carried 
out according to a clinical protocol (Spinazzola et al., 2008; 2014; Pia et al., in press), with the score 
ranking from 0 to 3 (only patients with a score ≥2 were admitted); b) pathological embodiment of 
an alien arm (E+ patients) (Garbarini et al., 2013a, 2014; Pia et al., 2013a). Patients were classified 
as E+ according to the pathological embodiment evaluation (see details below, Section 2.2.2.2).  
According to this evaluation, we recruited three right-brain-damaged patients (RBD) showing left-
limb-embodiment and one left-brain-damaged patient (LBD) showing right-limb-embodiment. 
Patients” lesion locations were identified through MRI or CT scans. Lesions were mapped onto the 
MNI stereotactic space with standard MRI volume (voxels of 1 mm3) through a computerized 
technique. Image manipulations were obtained with the software MRIcron (Rorden and Brett, 2000). 
Firstly, the MNI template was rotated on coronal, sagittal and horizontal planes according to the 
patient's scan angle. Secondly, a skilled rater (LP), manually mapped the lesion onto each 
correspondent template slice, whereas a second skilled rater (CF) double-checked for the accuracy 
of the tracings for each patient (in case of disagreement, an intersection lesion map was used – this 
occurred only once). Thirdly, the maps were back rotated into the standard space. Grey matter 
involvement was obtained by superimposing the Anatomical Labelling map template AAL (Tzourio-
Mazoyer et al., 2002) and the JHU-white matter template (Hua et al., 2008) which categorize the 
distributions of digital images onto stereotactic space. Patients” brain lesions locations are 
consistent with those de-scribed in previous studies (Garbarini et al., 2013a; 2014; Pia et al., 2013a). 
The involved brain structures are shown in Figure 2. 
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Fig. 2. Patients’ lesion reconstruction. E+1. Left-hemisphere lesions, involving: hippocampus, amygdala, middle temporal pole, 
parahippocampal gyrus, fusiform gyrus, heschl’s gyrus, temporo-parietal periventricular white matter. E+2. Right-hemisphere lesions, 
involving: superior longitudinal fasciculus, anterior limb of internal capsule, external capsule, putamen, globus pallidus, fronto-parietal 
periventricular white matter. E+3. Right-hemisphere lesions, involving: supramarginal gyrus, middle temporal pole, heschl’s gyrus, 
uncinate fasciculus, cingulum (hippocampus), posterior thalamus, retrolenticular part of internal capsule, putamen, sagittal stratum 
and temporo-parietal periventricular white matter. E+4. Right-hemisphere lesions, involving: precentral gyrus, inferior frontal 
operculum, inferior frontal gyrus (triangular part), inferior frontal gyrus (orbital part), rolandic operculum, insula, postcentral gyrus, 
supramarginal gyrus, angular gyrus, heschl’s gyrus, superior temporal gyrus, temporal pole (superior part), middle temporal gyrus. 
fronto-temporo-parietal periventricular white matter. 
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2.2.2.2.  Embodiment evaluation 
In order to include in the study only E+ patients, we tested them with an ad hoc protocol devised to 
diagnose the presence/ absence of embodiment (Garbarini et al., 2013a; 2014; Pia et al., 2013a). 
Patients sat on a chair with both hands lying on the table. According to the patient's embodiment 
side (left or right, de-pending on the damaged hemisphere, right or left, respectively), an alien 
left/right hand (the examiner's one) was positioned on the table next on the patient's hand in four 
different positions (see Fig. 3 A D). Note that the distance between the own and the alien hand was 
always the same (about 10 cm) in all conditions. The difference between conditions were: (1) the 
frame of reference of the alien hand position (egocentric in A, B and D and allocentric in C); (2) the 
alien hand-shoulder configuration (aligned with the patient's shoulder in A, C and D; misaligned in 
B); the alien hand body-side location (ipsilesional intact side in D; contralesional affected side in A, 
B and C). Prior to the beginning of the experiment, patients underwent 3 simple tests to assess their 
compliance with task demands and presence or absence of the embodiment phenomenon in that 
specific time. A white sheet of tissue was used to cover the patient's and the examiner's arms leaving 
the hands visible and three cubes of different colors (red, blue and green) were placed on the table. 
Patients were asked (1) to count how many hands and objects were on the table; (2) to reach their 
paralyzed hand with their intact hand and (3) to name the color of the cube positioned in front of 
their own hand. In order to start the experiment, a patient had to be errorless in test 1, i.e. identify 
the three objects and the three hands on the table. Note that in the Embodiment condition (A), E+ 
the patient fail test 2, i.e. reach the alien hand instead of his/her own hand and test 3, i.e. name the 
color of the cube in front of the alien hand instead of naming the color of the cube in front of his/her 
own hand. In the control conditions (B and C), as well as on the intact (ipsilesional) body side (D), the 
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pathological embodiment should not occur and all the patients should correctly reach/identify their 
own hand (see details in Fig. 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Embodiment evaluation. An alien left/right arm (the examiner's one) was positioned on the table in four different conditions: 
(A) The alien arm (in grey) is aligned with the patient's contralesional shoulder, in a position more proximal to the patient's trunk 
midline than the own arm (shoulder alignment condition). (B) The alien arm (in grey) is (externally) misaligned with respect to the 
patient's contralesional shoulder, in a position more distal with respect to the patient's trunk midline than the own arm (shoulder 
misalignment condition). C) The alien arm (in grey) is placed in a position more proximal to the patient trunk midline (as in A) but in 
an allocentric position, i.e. facing the patient (allocentric condition). (D) The alien arm (in grey) is aligned with the patient's ipsilesional 
shoulder, in a position more proximal to the patient's trunk midline than the own arm (intact-side condition). The patient was asked: 
(1) to count how many hands and objects were on the table; (2) to reach his/her own hemiplegic hand with his/her own non plegic 
ipsilesional hand and (3) to identify his/her own hand on the basis of the color of the object facing the hand. In all conditions the 
patient counts three objects (blue, red and green) and three hands (question 1). In (A) (lower part) the patient reaches the alien hand 
(the grey one) (question 2) and identifies his/ her own hand as the one in front of the blue cube (question 3); in (B) (lower part) the 
patient correctly reaches his/her own hand (the pink one) (question 2) and identifies it as the one facing the red cube (question 3); in 
(C) (lower part) the patient correctly reaches his/her own hand (question 2); in (D) (lower part) the patient correctly identifies his/her 
own hand as the one facing the red cube (question 3). Note that in (D) question 2 was not administered: given the contralesional 
paralysis, patients could not reach for the intact hand with the affected hand.  
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2.2.2.3. Experimental procedure 
Experiment 2, similarly to Experiment 1, comprised three phases: pre-training forearm-bisection task 
(15 pointing); tool-use training (15 min.); post-training forearm-bisection task (15 pointing) (see 
details in Section 2.1.3, Fig. 1A C). Note that both bisection tasks and tool-use training were 
performed by each patient in his/her contralesional side, where embodiment occurred (i.e. with the 
right side in E+ patient 1; with the left side in E+ patients 2, 3, 4). Furthermore, unlike healthy 
subjects, hemiplegic patients could not perform the tool-use training, because of hemiplegia, and 
they all were aware of their motor deficit; i.e. none of them were anosognosic for hemiplegia (see 
Table 1). Hence, in both E+ and E conditions, tool-use training was per-formed by the examiner's arm 
and patients were asked “to try” to use the garbage plier in order to perform the task. See details in 
Fig. 1C. 
 
2.2.2.4. Ownership evaluation 
In order to evaluate the patients” ownership during the task, at the end of the training phase of both 
E+ and E conditions, we addressed the following questions: 
1. Did you perform the task with your left/right hand? 
2. How could you perform the task with your left/right hand? 
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2.2.2.5. Data analysis   
In Experiment 2, the mean forearm bisection value of patients (n=4) was used as dependent variable. 
These data were entered in a 2*2 repeated measures ANOVA with “embodiment” (two levels: “E+” 
and “E-”) and “training” (two levels: “pre” and “post”) as within subject factors. Planned comparisons 
were performed in order to compute the contrasts of interest. Given the small sample size, we also 
performed a single subject analysis (non-parametric Wilcoxon test, e.g. Garbarini et al., 2013b). 
Finally, in order to compare the difference in performance be-tween pre- and post-training 
conditions between each single patient and the control sample, we used Crawford's test (two tailed) 
(Crawford et al., 2010). 
 
3.  Results 
3.1.  Experiment 1: healthy subjects’ forearm bisection task 
The ANOVA did not show any significant effect for the be-tween-subjects factor “tool” and for all the 
interactions with the “tool” factor, as well as for the within-subjects factors “condition” and 
“training”. The only significant interaction was “condition training” (F1,18=0.1558; p<0.001). In the 
Action condition, there was a significant increase of the mean forearm bisection values in the post-
training relative to the pre-training phase (Action pre=41.69% ± 77.15 (St.Dev); Action post=45.78%  
± 76.9; planned comparison: F1,18 =5.061; p=0.038). This means that, after training, subjects relatively 
overestimated their forearm length (see Fig.4). Conversely, in the Observation condition, no 
significant difference between pre- and post-training was found (Observation pre =42.7% ± 77.44; 
Observation post =40.46% ± 79.8; planned comparison: F1,18 =3.181; p =0.093). Unexpectedly, a not 
significant tendency in the opposite direction (i.e. a decrease of the mean bisection values in the 
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post-respect to the pre-training phase) was apparent (see Fig. 4).The results of the additional ANOVA 
directly testing the contrast Observation-with-tool vs Observation-without-tool (ruling out the 
possible confound of the Action condition), show that the presence of the tool in the subject's hand 
was not a significant factor by itself or in the interaction with the pre/post training measurements. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Fig. 4. Results of Experiment 1: Action vs Observation. Graphic representation of normal subjects” (n=20) mean forearm bisection 
values (in %) in the pre-training (PRE) and in the post-training phase (POST) during the Action (in red, continuous line) and the 
Observation (in blue, dotted line) conditions. ***p<0.0001; **p<0.001; *p<0.01.  
 
The results of the additional ANOVA directly testing the contrast left-hand training vs right-hand 
training, show that the be-tween-subject factor “side” is not significant by itself or in the interaction 
with the pre/post training measurements. The ANOVA found a significant effect of the within-factor 
“training” (F1,28 =10; p<.003), suggesting that in both the left- and right-training there was a 
significant increase of the mean forearm bisection values in the post- with respect to the pre-training 
condition (see Fig. 5). 
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3.2.  Experiment 2 
3.2.1.  Embodiment evaluation in E+ patients 
In the E+ condition, at the end of the training phase, all patients positively answered to the first 
question (Did you perform the task with your left/right hand?), claiming to have performed the tool-
use training with their own (paralyzed) arm. The second question (How could you perform task whit 
your left/right hand?) produced different answers among patients: E+ 1: “I don't know how I could 
Fig. 5. Results of Experiment 1: Dominant hand vs Non-
dominant hand. Graphic representation of the mean forearm 
bisection values (in %) in normal subjects performing the 
active tool-use training with the dominant (right) hand (n=10) 
(in red, continuous line) or with the non-dominant (left) hand 
(n=20) (in blue, dotted line) in the pre- (PRE) and post-
training (POST) conditions. The effect of training is significant 
(*p<0.01) with no difference between training performed 
with the left (non- dominant) or right (dominant) hand.  
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Results of Experiment 2: E+ condition vs E- condition. 
Graphic re-presentation of patients’ (N=4) mean forearm 
bisection values (in %) in the pre-training (PRE) and in the post-
training phase (POST) during the left/right arm E+ condition (in 
red, continuous line) and the left/right arm E- condition (in 
blue, dotted line). *p<0.01.  
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do this… The task was tiring but nice!”; E+ 2: “It's easy to use this plier, only a little movement is 
enough to trigger the lever… can I try with the other hand?”; E+ 3: “For sure I have done this task 
with your (the examiner) help…”. E+ 4: “I know that you (the examiner) helped me, but I have done 
it!”. An ex-ample is shown in Video 2: E+ 1 patient is filmed while per-forming the tool-use training 
in the E+ condition and clearly shows that he is convinced to perform the task with her own arm. On 
the contrary, in the E condition all patients negatively answered to the first question, correctly 
acknowledging that they did not perform the training with their own arm. Examples are shown in 
Video Supplementary Materials available online. 
 
3.2.2.  E+ patients’ forearm bisection task 
The ANOVA did not show significant effects for the within-subjects factors “embodiment” and 
“training”, but, more relevant for the purpose of the study, showed significant effects for the 
interaction “training*embodiment” (F1,3 =38.839; p<0.01). In the E+ condition, there was a 
significant increase of the mean forearm bisection values in the post-training relative to the pre-
training phase (E+ pre=45.40% ± 711.03 (St.Dev); E+ post=66.36% ± 716.21; planned comparison: F1,3 
=30.15; p=0.011). This means that, after training, patients relatively overestimated their forearm 
length (see Fig. 6). Conversely, in the E- condition, no significant difference between pre- and post-
training was found (E pre= 64.27% ± 732.29; E post =55.18% ± 727.06; planned comparison: F1,3 
=5.18; p=0.1). See Fig. 6. 
Single subject analysis revealed that, in the E+ condition, all four patients (similarly to healthy 
subjects in the Action condition of Experiment 1) showed a significant increase of the bisection 
values in the post- with respect to the pre-training phase (Wilcoxon tests: E+1: Z=3.29; p<0.001; E+2: 
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Z=3.4; p<0.001; E+3: Z=3.4; p<0.001; E +4: Z=3.4; p<0.001), suggesting the presence of a consistent 
overestimation of forearm length after tool-use when patients were convinced to perform it with 
their own hand hemiplegic arm. In the E condition, two out of four patients (E+ 1; E+ 2) did not show 
any difference between pre- and post-training phase; surprisingly, the other two patients showed a 
significant decrease of the bisection values in the post-respect to the pre-training phase (Wilcoxon 
test: E+3: Z=3.4; p<0.001; E+4: Z=3.4; p<0.001), suggesting the presence of a relative 
underestimation effect following the training (similarly to the tendency showed by healthy subjects 
in the Observation condition of Experiment 1). It is also apparent that, in the pre-training, forearm 
bisection values in the E condition exceed those found in the E+ condition. To this respect, it must 
be pointed out that the difference is not significant and it is caused by the performance of 2 patients 
out of 4 (Wilcoxon test: E+3 E- vs E+: Z=3.4; p=0.00065; E+4E- vs E+: Z=3.4; p=0.00065). As suggested by 
an anonymous reviewer, we controlled if the ANOVA results (described above) were driven by the 
above reported difference in baseline values. In an ANCOVA model, where the baseline values were 
assumed as a covariate, we verified that the crucial interaction “training*embodiment” was still 
significant (F1,2 =33.3; p=0.02), even controlling for the baseline covariate (that was not significant in 
itself (F1,2 =9; p=1). This suggest that the difference in baselines is unlikely to have influenced our 
findings. The Crawford's test (Crawford et al., 2010) was used to compare the results of each patient, 
tested in Experiment 2, with the results of healthy subjects in Experiment 1 (see Fig. 7). First, we 
tested whether the effect of tool-use training (the difference post- minus pre-training bisection 
values) in the E+ condition was significantly different in patients vs healthy subjects. Crawford's tests 
(two tailed) revealed that in three out of four patients the effect was significantly greater (E+ 1: Z 
DCC [difference between case and controls] = 4.826; p=0.0001; E+2: Z DCC= 3.172; p =0.005; E+3: Z 
DCC= 4.420; p=0.003). Hence, this means that the relative overestimation effect after tool-use is 
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stronger in patients than in controls. Secondly, we tested whether the effect of tool-use training (the 
difference post- minus pre-training bisection values) in the E+ condition was significantly different 
from the effect of the Observation condition in healthy subjects. Crucially, although de facto in the 
E + condition patients observed an alien arm per-forming the training (similarly to controls in the 
Observation condition), Crawford's tests (two tailed) found a significant difference between each 
patient in the E+ condition and controls in the Observation condition (i.e. after tool-use patients 
over-estimated their forearm length, whereas healthy controls tended to underestimate it) (E+ 1: Z 
DCC= 4.892; p=0.0001; E+ 2: Z DCC= 3.420; p=0.003; E+ 3: Z DCC= 3.814; p=0.006; E+ 4: Z DCC= 2.483; 
p=0.03). Finally, we compared the effect of tool use training (the difference post- minus pre-training 
bisection values) in the E condition, in each patient vs healthy subjects. In two out of four patients 
(E+ 1; E+ 2) Crawford's tests did not find any significant difference with respect to controls. Patients 
E+ 3 and 4, instead, showed a relative underestimation effect of their forearm length stronger than 
that found in healthy subjects (E+ 3: Z DCC=5.384; p=0.007; E+ 4: Z DCC=3.862; p=0.003). We also 
performed Crawford tests in order to compare the pre-training bisection values of each patient with 
those of the control group. In the E+ condition, we found a significant difference in one out of four 
patients (E+ 3: Z CC=2.8; p=0.013); in the E condition, we found a significant difference in two out of 
four patients (E+ 3: Z CC=9.4; p<0.0001 and E+ 4: Z CC=3.2; p=0.004). This greater variability in the 
bisection task in patients than in controls, suggests that an altered body metric re-presentation, also 
present in the baseline (pre-training) condition, can be associated to the body ownership disorders 
observed in this kind of patients. 
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Fig. 7. Comparison between patients (Experiment 2) and healthy subjects (Experiment 1). (A) Bar plot showing the effect of tool use 
training (Post Pre) on Arm's length estimation in single patients and in control subjects (E+ and Action condition, respectively). A general 
overestimation effect is evident. Overestimation effects in single patients are compared with those in the control group. (B) Bar plot 
showing the effect of tool use Observation (Post Pre) on Arm's length estimation in single patients and in control subjects (E and 
Observation condition, respectively). A general tendency to underestimation of arm length is apparent. Under-estimation effects in single 
patients are compared with those in the control group. ***p<0.0001; **p<0.001; *p<0.01. 
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4.  Discussion 
In the present work we sought for evidence that the influence of tool-use training on the body spatial 
representation is affected by body ownership. Two experiments were carried out, one involving 
healthy subjects (Experiment 1), the other involving brain-damaged hemiplegic patients with 
pathological embodiment of an alien arm (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, we asked whether tool-
use actions with the own arm or observing an alien arm using tools can induce comparable 
modulation effects on the body spatial representation. In Experiment 2, the main question was 
whether an altered sense of ownership of body parts (embodiment of an alien arm) 1) extends to 
the representation of the movement of the alien arm using tools and 2) modulates the sensory map 
of the own arm. In Experiment 1, healthy subjects actually performed a tool-use training (Action 
condition), or observed the examiner's arm performing the training (Observation condition). In the 
Action condition, an overestimation effect of their forearm length was found; namely significantly 
greater forearm bisection values in the post-than in the pre-training phase were apparent. On the 
contrary, in the Observation condition, no significant difference was found, either when subjects 
held a similar tool in their hand (with-tool condition) or when they did not (without-tool condition). 
No difference between left hand and right hand training was found. In the experiment with 
hemiplegic patients (Experiment 2), although the patients were explicitly required to try to perform 
an active task with their own plegic arm, the tool-use training was always performed by the 
examiner's arm (as in the Observation condition of Experiment 1), acting in two different positions, 
aligned (E+) or misaligned (E-) with respect to the patients’ shoulder. Crucially, in the E+ condition, 
where the embodiment occurred (i.e. patients were convinced to perform the tool-use training with 
their own (paralyzed) arm), a significant over-estimation effect was found (as in the Action condition 
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with normal subjects): patients mislocated their forearm midpoint more proximally to the hand in 
the post than in the pre training phase. Conversely, in the E condition, when the pathological 
embodiment did not occur, they did not show any overestimation effect. The results of Experiment 
1 replicate previous findings (Sposito et al., 2012; Cardinali et al., 2011), confirming that, in healthy 
subjects, active tool-use induces dynamic changes in the re-presentation of body metrics. In line with 
Sposito and coworkers’ findings, no training-dependent difference between the non-dominant (left) 
and the dominant (right) hand training was found. However, at least one study, employing different 
training tasks, has found significant differences between the dominant and the non-dominant hand 
in the augmentation of body representation following tool use (Rademaker et al., 2014). This 
different result between Rademaker et al. and our study can be ascribed to the different skillfulness 
level needed to perform the tasks involved in the two experiments: holding a cotton ball with a 
chopstick with the right and left hand simultaneously in Rademaker et al. experiment (difficult task, 
higher skillfulness); using a garbage plier to retrieve targets with the left or the right hand in ours 
(easy task, lower skillfulness). Hence, given that skillfulness is higher for the dominant than the non-
dominant hand, and it positively correlates with the probability of body representation modulation 
by tool use (Rademaker et al., 2014), it follows that in more difficult tasks (such as that of Rademaker 
et al.’s it is more likely that differences can be detected between the dominant and the non-
dominant hand, whereas this is less likely to be the case in easier tasks (such as that used in our 
experiment), where similar performances can be expected between the two hands. Going back to 
Sposito et al. findings, differently from their results, in our experiment healthy participants showed 
average forearm midpoint estimation below 50% in both the pre- and the post-training conditions. 
This may be related to fact that the Experiment 1 sample was made of elderly individuals (57-90 
years of age, mean 70.5 ± 10.6), matched for age and educational level with E+ patients tested in the 
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Experiment 2, whereas in Sposito's experiment healthy subjects were university students. We might 
speculate, to this respect, that elderly subjects tend to underuse their upper (and, possibly, lower) 
limbs, due to restricted movement capabilities and necessities, resulting in absolute 
underestimation of upper (and lower) limbs length (but relative overestimation following tool-use 
training). On the other hand, absence of a similar effect in the Observation condition suggests that, 
at least in our sample, active tool-use is necessary in order to induce dynamic changes in the body-
metrics representation, whereas tool-use observation alone is not sufficient. However, some effects 
of tool-use observation on space representation were found in previous works. In particular, 
Costantini and co-workers (Costantini et al., 2011) showed that observing an alien arm performing 
finalized actions with a tool may extend the representation of the reaching space of the observer, 
but only when the latter shares the same action potentialities with the agent, i.e. when holding a 
tool compatible with the goal and the spatial range of the observed action. In our experiment we 
could not replicate this result: holding or not the same tool as the experimenter, while observing 
his/her arm retrieving targets with the garbage plier, did not induce spatial extension of the 
observer's reaching space (that is, it did not significantly influence the subject's estimation of the 
midpoint of his/her own forearm). A number of factors can account for the discrepancies of the 
results between the two experiments. Firstly, the two studies might measure a different kind of 
representation: a space representation in Costantini's et al. experiment, and a body representation 
in the present report. Even though the peripersonal space representation and the body schema are 
tightly linked (e.g. Cardinali et al., 2009), they can be measured in different ways. Secondly, the 
dependent variables used in the two studies are different response time (RT) of the observer in the 
case of Costantini's et al. experiment, forearm bisection value in our experiment – and, therefore, 
might be differentially sensitive to the phenomenon investigated. It may well be the case that RT is 
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a more sensitive measure of spatial remapping than forearm bisection. Thirdly, while it is possible 
that during the observation of finalized actions with a tool a mirror mechanism is activated (Rizzolatti 
et al., 2001) that is robust enough to remap the spatial representation of the observer in a RT task 
such as that employed in the Costantini's et al. study, it is also likely that the same mirror mechanism 
is not strong enough to significantly modify the sensory representation of the observer's arm in the 
forearm bisection task devised in our study. Indeed, appropriate visuomotor and proprioceptive 
feedback signals may be necessary to obtain the above mentioned remapping of the observer's arm 
length representation. Although very tentative, a possible explanation could be that, during the 
observation of finalized actions performed with a tool, the inhibitory process known to prevent the 
imitation of the observed actions (e.g. Stamos et al., 2010; Mukamel et al., 2010), can have some 
role in preventing the updating of the body schema and, in turn, the body spatial remapping. It could 
be hypothesized that it is more demanding for the nervous system, in terms of energetic expense, 
to activate the plastic processes underlying the re-modulation of the sensory map of one part of the 
body, than those necessary to re-map a spatial sector (e.g. far space) into another (e.g. near space). 
The above mentioned inhibitory mechanism could also be somehow related to the opposite 
underestimation trend, shown in the Observation condition at least in some subjects. It is worth 
noting that the Observation condition is crucial for distinguishing between remapping effects 
induced by motor activation or by attentional processing. Indeed, if attentional mechanisms could 
fully explain the effects found following tool-use (e.g., Holmes et al., 2008), similar results should be 
expected in Action and Observation conditions, where the subject's spatial attention is equally 
involved (in both conditions the subject has to pay attention to the tip of the garbage plier, grasping 
targets in far space and putting them in the requested box); and this is not the case. In Experiment 
2, instead, E+ patients showed an over-estimation of their own forearm length after tool-use training 
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performed by the alien (embodied) arm. This clearly suggests that an altered sense of body 
ownership of someone else's arm can extend to intentional motor processes and modulate own 
body spatial representation. Furthermore, comparing the results of single patients with those of the 
sample of healthy subjects, the overestimation effect revealed by each patient during the E+ 
condition was greater than that found in healthy subjects during the Active condition (the difference 
was significant in three out of four patients at Crawford test), suggesting that when body awareness 
is selectively impaired, the body-metrics representation is more susceptible to be altered. According 
to previous studies (e.g. Garbarini et al., 2012; Pia et al. 2013b; Garbarini et al., 2013a; Gondola et 
al., 2014), hemiplegic patients fully aware of their paralysis, when asked to try to perform motor acts 
with their paralyzed hand/arm, do not produce any effective motor programming. However, when 
a pathological embodiment occurs, as in the E+ condition of our experiment, the delusion of 
ownership affects both the motor awareness and the sense of agency (patients, although not 
anosognosic before the task – see Table 1 – are firmly convinced to perform the tool-use training 
with their own plegic arm). This, in turn, might automatically trigger intentional motor processes for 
the own plegic arm, which generate the updating of the body schema and lead to the remapping of 
one's own forearm length (similarly to healthy subjects actually performing the tool use training in 
the Active condition). It is important to note that the delusion of ownership, as it is also evident in 
the rubber hand illusion (Pavani et al., 2000; Farnè et al., 2000; Costantini and Haggard, 2007), is 
observed only when the alien hand is located, in egocentric coordinates, in a plausible position, 
compatible with the observer body schema. If this condition is not fulfilled, as in the E- condition of 
our experiment where the alien hand is misaligned with respect to the patients’ shoulder, the 
embodiment does not occur. In this case, patients immediately ascribe the movements to the 
examiner's arm and, although required to try to perform the task as in the E+ condition, de facto 
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observed the examiner performing the task, and do not show any significant remapping of their 
forearm length, similarly to healthy subjects during Observation conditions. According to Cardinali 
et al. (2009) “the body schema does not accept any incoherence. This mean that when a conflict 
occurs between two inputs” as, in our case, two left/right hands on the table, “the brain solves it in 
the direction of one of them” (p. 5). We can speculate that, in this kind of patients, when the body 
representation is altered, the more coherent position for the arm/hand (i.e. when the arm is 
perfectly aligned with the shoulder and close to the body) can orient the patients’ sense of body 
ownership. Finally, in the observation condition, it must be acknowledged the presence of a non-
significant tendency towards underestimation of the one's own arm length in the majority of control 
subjects and in two out of four patients. This tendency was significantly greater in the two patients 
than in healthy subjects. These results were unexpected and we do not have yet a convincing 
explanation for it. Nevertheless, they might be worth of further investigation in their own right on a 
larger sample of patients. The possibility exists that they are related to a specific inhibitory 
mechanism activated during the observation of someone else's finalized actions preventing action 
execution when contextual conditions (passive observation of someone else's movement or imaging 
one's own movement) are inadequate to trigger the anticipatory neurocognitive plastic processes 
(e.g. space and body metrics remapping) subserving a future action. From an anatomical point of 
view, previous studies (Garbarini et al., 2013a, 2014; Pia et al., 2013a) described left-side 
embodiment following right-brain damage. Here, for the first time, a right-side embodiment 
following left-brain damage was described in patient E+1 (see Fig. 2). This suggests that, although it 
seems to be more frequently associated to right-brain lesions, this phenomenon is not related to a 
specific function of the right hemi-sphere. Although this datum needs further investigation on a 
larger sample of patients, it suggests the presence of a right hemi-sphere dominance for the building 
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of the sense of body ownership rather than an absolute lateralization of this function in the right 
hemisphere (see also Tsakiris et al., 2008). According to previous studies (Garbarini et al., 2013a, 
2014; Pia et al., 2013a), pathological embodiment is related to damage to subcortical motor 
structures (basal ganglia: globus pallidus, putamen) and periventricular white matter. Lesions 
locations of patients tested here is compatible with this pattern (see Fig. 2), that is also consistent 
with the one identified for being responsible for somatoparaphrenia (Gandola et al., 2012), thus 
suggesting a common locus for the two complementary body awareness disorders. Following 
Gandola et. al. interpretation, we can hypothesize that a damage to the white matter tract linking 
subcortical structures with cortical sensory-motor and associative areas may prevent the integration 
of afferent information arising from the affected body part (bottom-up processes) with higher-order 
and pre-existing body re-presentations (top-down processes) leading to a deficit in the construction 
of a coherent body representation (Tsakiris et al., 2006, 2007, 2008). We may speculate that when 
the representation of the contralesional hand is partially impaired or made fragile by the brain 
damage, as in E+ patients, the brain solves the incoherence of the “mutilated” body representation 
by automatically incorporating an alien hand so to regain consistency and functionality. In 
conclusion, these findings demonstrate that, in presence of a delusion of ownership of a body part, 
the alien body part can be so deeply incorporated into one's own body schema to extend to action 
execution and to induce measurable dynamic changes in the body-metrics representation 
comparable to those observed during really executed movements. This phenomenon is still far from 
being fully understood at the level of its neurocognitive mechanisms and a number of important 
questions still need to be answered. For example, the role of motor intentionality in the emergence 
of the sense of body ownership needs to be more deeply investigated. Does embodiment of an alien 
arm equally develop in absence of intention to move the own paralyzed arm, e.g. if the patient is 
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asked to passively observe someone else's arm movement? Or, else, do patients with embodiment 
show similar remapping of one's own hemiplegic arm's length representation when asked only to 
imagine to reach for far objects with a tool? Despite being only on the verge of a full understanding 
of the embodiment phenomenon, the so far collected experimental results, if further confirmed on 
a larger sample of patients, might have important fallbacks in the domain of neuropsychological 
rehabilitation. For example, it could be the case that hemiplegic patients with embodiment of an 
alien arm might benefit more from an observational motor training (i.e. a motor training actually 
performed by an alien arm) than a passive motor training, where embodiment does not occur. 
 
4.1.  Limitations of the study 
We acknowledge a number of limitations of the present study: 1) the design adopted in both elderly 
controls (Experiment 1) and brain-damaged patients (Experiment 2) was not the ideal one. In both 
experiments, in order to avoid sequence effects, patients and controls were tested in two different 
experimental sessions (at one week distance) and we preferred not to add further experimental 
sessions, although this choice compromised the optimal full within-subject design, with three 
experimental sessions in Experiment 1 (Action; Observation with-tool; Observation without-tool) 
and with four experimental sessions in Experiment 2 (E+ condition with- and without-tool; E- 
condition with- and with-out-tool); 2) different instructions were –necessarily- given to control 
subjects in the Observation conditions (they were requested to stay still and to observe the 
examiner's arm performing the task), and to patients in the E+ and E- conditions (they were required 
to perform an “active” task, being asked to “try” to use the garbage plier with their plegic hand), 
thus rendering the two experiments not fully comparable. On the one hand, in Experiment 1, the 
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Observation conditions (with- and without-tool) were introduced in order to exclude the possibility 
that a visual feedback alone (vision of the alien arm using the tool) can be able to alter the body 
metric representation. If so, all the effects found in patients could be ascribed to the visual feedback 
and not to the pathological embodiment. On the other hand, in Experiment 2, in order to compare 
the results of the patients’ E+ and E- conditions with those found in healthy controls actually 
performing the tool-use training, it was crucial to ask the patients to perform an active task. 
  
  
63 
 
Chapter 3 
Decreased motor cortex excitability mirrors own hand disembodiment during the rubber hand 
illusion 
3.1 Introduction 
The sense of body ownership (i.e. the belief that a specific body part belongs to one’s own body) 
(Gallagher, 2000) is a fundamental aspect of self-consciousness. Apparently, in normal conditions, 
the feeling of body ownership does not need any particular explanation; it is immediate and even 
obvious. However, both pathological cases after brain damage (somatoparaphrenia [Romano et al., 
2014] and pathological embodiment [Pia et al., 2016; Fossataro et al., 2016; Garbarini et al., 2013, 
2014, 2015; Pia et al., 2013; Garbarini and Pia, 2013]) and experimental manipulations in healthy 
subjects (e.g. the rubber hand illusion – RHI [Botvinick and Cohen, 1998]) suggest that body 
ownership, as we normally experience it, is the product of many different and complex operations. 
It has been suggested that the feeling that our body belongs to us presumably depends on 
multisensory integration processes arising within a fronto-parietal network, where sensory inputs 
coming from different modalities are realigned in a unique reference frame (Blanke et al., 2015). 
Within this network, the ventral premotor cortex seems to play a crucial role, thus establishing, both 
in monkeys (Graziano, 1999) and in humans (Makin et al., 2008; Ehrsson et al., 2004), an anatomical 
link between the sense of body ownership and the motor system. Furthermore, it has been pro-
posed that voluntary motor activity of body parts contributes critically to the subjective experience 
of body ownership (Tsakiris et al., 2010). Within this context, we asked whether the subjective and 
sometimes illusory sense of body ownership influences objective measures of the sensory-motor 
system. We took advantage of the RHI paradigm in order to provide a physiological counterpart of 
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the interaction between body awareness and motor control, investigating the relationship between 
body ownership alterations, such as those occurring during the RHI, and modulation of primary 
motor cortex excitability. During the RHI, the subject’s real hand is out of view, while a realistic 
rubber hand (RH) is positioned in its place. When the experimenter synchronously strokes the index 
finger of both the real and the fake hand, most subjects, after a few seconds of viewing the fake 
hand’s finger being touched, attribute their tactile sensation to the RH hand, which they start to 
perceive as their own. During the illusion, the subject’s hand-centered reference frame shifts 
towards the RH, and so it has been proposed that, as a consequence, the real hand is subject to a 
sort of disembodiment (Ehrsson et al., 2004). Accordingly, a feeling of disownership of one’s own 
hand has been reported as an important behavioral component of the RHI (Longo et al., 2008), while 
a decrease in the temperature of the real (disembodied) hand has been observed as a 
neurophysiological correlate of the RHI (Moseley et al., 2008). Moreover, it has been demonstrated 
that cooling the subject’s hand increases the strength of the RHI, whereas warming the hand 
decreases it (Kammers et al., 2011). However, another study found that hand-cooling can be present 
in both the experimental (synchronous) and the control (asynchronous) condition, thus suggesting 
that it is not a reliable correlate of the subjective feeling of hand disownership in the RHI (Rohde et 
al., 2013). A further study proposed that somatosensory changes observed in the participants’ hand 
while experiencing the RHI can be explained by cross-modal mismatch between the seen and felt 
position of the hand, and are not necessarily a signature of disownership (Folegatti et al., 2009).  
In the present study, in the main behavioral experiment, we employed a classical RHI procedure to 
investigate the presence of the illusory experience in our subject sample. In addition, in the control 
behavioral experiment, the complementary presence of both embodiment of the RH and 
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disembodiment of the real hand was explicitly investigated. Moreover, during the main physiological 
experiment, we studied the excitability modulation of motor circuits to the real (stimulated) hand 
during RHI. While subjects received visual-tactile stimulations, either synchronous (to induce the 
illusion) or asynchronous (control condition), motor evoked potentials (MEPs) were elicited by a 
single-pulse of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over the left primary motor cortex (M1) and 
recorded from the right first dorsal interosseous muscle (FDI). See details in Material and methods 
and in Figure 1A. 
We hypothesized that, in the motor domain, a disembodiment effect during the RHI might be 
measurable as a lower excitability of motor pathways to the real hand, i.e. a situation in which a 
stronger voluntary command is needed to bring enough motor neurons to threshold and thus to 
elicit movement. Thus, a decrease of FDI MEP amplitude compared to the baseline, specific to the 
real (disembodied) hand, was expected in the synchronous condition (where the subjects 
experienced the RHI) and not in the asynchronous (control) condition. Furthermore, according to 
behavioral studies reporting an increased illusory experience over time (Lewis and Lloyd, 2010; 
Valenzuela Moguillansky et al., 2013), this inhibitory motor response was expected to increase 
during exposure to the illusion. Finally, we expected the MEP amplitude decrease to be specific for 
the stimulated (right) hand, i.e. no amplitude modulation in the non-stimulated (left) hand (see 
Figure 1B; control physiological experiment). 
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3.2 Material and methods 
3.2.1 Participants 
Twenty-six (ten male) volunteers took part in the behavioral main experiment (mean age ± SD=24 ± 
5 years) (the sample size estimation was performed according to an a priori power analysis, see 
details in Supplementary file 1). Additionally, a different sample of 26 subjects (ten male) (mean age 
± SD=24 ± 4 years) were recruited for the behavioral control experiment. Subjects participated in the 
physiological experiments only if, in the embodiment questionnaire, they gave a rating higher than 
zero in the synchronous condition. According to this criterion, 24 out of 26 subjects participated in 
the physiological main experiment; 20 out of 26 subjects participated in the physiological control 
experiment. 
All participants were right-handed, as assessed with the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory, and were 
screened to exclude a family history of psychiatric, neurological or medical disease. The 
experimental protocol was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Milano and 
written informed consent was obtained from each subject in compliance with the rules of the 1964 
Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
3.2.2 RHI experimental procedure 
In both main (Figure 1A) and control (Figure 1B) experiments, the RHI was evoked by the synchro-
nous stroking of the rubber hand and of the participant’s own hidden hand (the location of stroking 
on the two hands was carefully matched) using the traditional visual-tactile stimulation (Botvinick 
and Cohen, 1998). Asynchronous stroking of a participant own hand and the rubber hand was 
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utilized as a control condition, in which strokes were delivered spatially and temporally out of phase 
between the two hands. Participants sat with their forearms resting on a table, with their right hand 
inserted, palm down, in one of two identical compartments of a wooden box (59 cm 33 cm 15 cm); 
the rubber hand was placed in the left compartment, in egocentric position and aligned with the 
participant’s shoulder. The upper lid of the box could be lifted or lowered to either reveal or occlude 
the participant’s view of the rubber hand in the left compartment, while his/her right hand was 
always out of view. The participant was able to see only the rubber hand being stroked by the 
experimenter’s right hand, while the subject’s right hand and the experimenter’s left hand were 
always out of subject’s view. The distance between the index finger of the rubber hand and the 
participant’s own right index finger was 20 cm. A cloth was placed so as to hide both the participant’s 
shoulder and the proximal end of the rubber hand. The behavioral RHI effect was measured in two 
ways: (1) by asking participants to localize the position of their unseen hand along the horizontal 
plan in front of them, and thus obtaining a measure of the proprioceptive drift towards the rubber 
hand, (2) with a questionnaire investigating their feeling of ownership of the rubber hand as a 
consequence of the experimental manipulation. Moreover, in the control experiment, we also 
measured the disembodiment experience of the stimulated hand with a questionnaire investigating 
the feeling of loss of own hand (Longo et al., 2008). The physiological effect was measured by 
recording motor-evoked potentials (MEPs), utilized to evaluate the excitability modulation of cortical 
and spinal motor neurons during the RHI. In the main experiment, MEPs were recorded from the 
real stimulated (right) hand, while in the control experiment, MEPs were recorded from the contra-
lateral non-stimulated (left) hand. 
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FIG 1. Experimental setup. The white square indicates the opening in the experimental wooden box through which the rubber hand 
is visible to the subject. Subjects could see only the rubber hand being stroked by the experimenter’s right hand. In A, main 
experiment, MEPs were acquired from the stimulated (right) hand’s FDI muscle; in B, control experiment, MEPs were acquired from 
non-stimulated (left) hand’s FDI muscle. In C, timeline of the study and experimental conditions are plotted. 
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3.2.3 TMS and EMG recordings 
Behavioral and physiological experiments were done in separate sessions: recording of MEPs in the 
three experimental conditions required about 40 min, and inserting the hand-ownership evaluation 
questions would have prolonged the experiment beyond a reasonable and feasible time, increasing 
the probability that subjects move their head with respect to the coil or lose their concentration on 
the task. In the main experiment, MEPs were elicited by single-pulse transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) of the hand area in the left M1 and recorded by self-adhesive bipolar surface 
electrodes that were placed over the belly of the right first dorsal interosseous muscle (FDI). 
Electromyography (EMG) signals were amplified, filtered (10 Hz to 1 kHz), digitally converted 
(sampling rate 5 kHz) and stored in a computer for offline analysis. The head of each subject was 
restrained by a comfortable pillow wrapping around the neck and supported by a fixed head rest. A 
mechanical arm held a figure-of-eight-shaped coil connected to a magnetic stimulator (Magstim 200; 
Magstim Co. Ltd, Whit-land, UK; maximal power 2.2 T). The coil was positioned and fixed on the left 
primary motor cortex with the handle pointing backwards at 45% from the midline so as to activate 
the selected muscle, and the stimulator output was set at about 110% of each subject’s motor 
threshold (defined as the intensity giving three MEP responses out of six stimuli) (Rossini et al., 1994; 
Borroni et al., 2008). The absence of voluntary contraction before each TMS pulse was verified by 
continuous monitoring of the EMG signal. We replicated the same procedure in the control 
experiment, but in this case, MEPs were elicited by single-pulse TMS of the hand area in the right 
M1 and recorded with self-adhesive bipolar surface electrodes over the left FDI belly. 
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3.2.4 Experimental events sequence 
3.2.4.1 Baseline condition 
At the very beginning of each experiment, after they gave their informed consent, subjects were 
asked to watch a cross on a pc screen while sitting in a comfortable chair. In the meantime, 20 MEPs 
were recorded (without visual-tactile stimulation) and taken as a measure of motor-cortex 
excitability in a neutral condition. 
 
3.2.4.2 Behavioral measurements 
In both main and control experiments, participants were asked to judge the perceived location of 
their unseen right index finger by verbally indicating a number on a ruler presented on top of the 
box in front of them. This was repeated for 10 trials, and in each trial the ruler was shifted horizon-
tally so as to avoid the subjects’ basing their answers on a fixed reference point, rather than on their 
actual proprioceptive judgment. The difference between the indicated location of the participant’s 
right index finger before and after the visual-tactile stimulation was taken as a measure of perceptual 
relocation. In order to evaluate the subjective experience of the RHI, an ownership questionnaire 
(emb-q-rating) consisting of three statements was administered; participants were asked to evaluate 
the vivid-ness of their experience of ownership of the rubber hand using a 7 points Likert scale (–
3=strong disagreement; +3=strong agreement; 0=neither agreement nor disagreement), with the 
following three items: “It seemed as if I were feeling the touch in the location where I saw the rubber 
hand touched”, “It seemed as though the touch I felt was caused by the touch over the rubber hand”, 
“I felt as if the rubber hand were my hand”. The statements were based on the traditional RHI study 
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(Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). This behavioral part was performed both to replicate results found in 
previous studies (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris et al., 2010; Longo et al., 
2008; Moseley et al., 2008; Kammers et al., 2011; Rohde et al., 2013; Folegatti et al., 2009; Lewis and 
Lloyd, 2010; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005) on the behavioral RH effect and in order to include in the 
study only those subjects who experienced the illusion (with ratings higher than zero in the 
synchronous condition). Note that, according to this criterion, two sub-jects in the main experiment 
were not admitted to the physiological experiment. Moreover, in the control experiment, in order 
to verify whether the feeling of ownership of the RH is coherently accompanied by a feeling of 
disownership of the stimulated hand, a disownership questionnaire (disemb-q-rating) consisting of 
three statements was also administered. Participants were asked to evaluate the strength of their 
disembodiment experience over the stimulated hand using a 7-point Likert scale (–3=strong 
disagreement; +3=strong agreement; 0=neither agreement nor disagreement), with the following 
three items: "It seemed like I was unable to move my hand", "It seemed like I couldn’t really tell 
where my hand was", "I seemed like my hand had disappeared". The statements were selected from 
a study proposing a psychometric approach to body ownership (Longo et al., 2008). 
 
3.2.4.3 Physiological measurements 
For both main and control experiments, at the end of the behavioral procedure, 20 MEPs were 
recorded during both synchronous and asynchronous conditions. The order of the experimental 
blocks (synchronous-asynchronous; asynchronous-synchronous) was counterbalanced between 
sub-jects. Participants received an experimental block of 20 visual-tactile stimulations, either 
synchronous or asynchronous, depending on the random order of the sequence. Each visual-tactile 
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stimulation cycle lasted 12 s. Two seconds after the end of each cycle, a single-pulse TMS was 
triggered to induce a MEP, using a custom-made synchronizing program in LabView10. After an inter-
trial interval of 3 s, the next stimulation cycle started. Therefore, for each subject, 60 MEPs were 
recorded: 20 during the baseline conditions (at the beginning of the whole procedure) and 40 during 
the visual-tactile stimulation (20 during the synchronous block; 20 during the asynchronous). 
Participants were exposed to both experimental blocks (synchronous/asynchronous) in the same 
experimental session, with a resting break between the blocks (lasting about 5 min). The return of 
cortical excitability to baseline level was always ascertained before starting each block of visuo-
tactile stimulation. The whole experimental procedure, including behavioral and physiological 
experiment, lasted about 40 min. 
 
3.2.5 Behavioral analysis 
In both main and control experiments, the mean value of the three ownership statements used in 
the subjective rating questionnaire, in the synchronous and asynchronous conditions, was obtained 
and used as a dependent variable (emb-q-rating); in the control group, we also obtained and used 
as a dependent variable the mean value of the three disownership statements, in the synchronous 
and asynchronous conditions (emb-q-rating and disemb-q-rating). For the proprioceptive drift, the 
difference between the indicated location of the participant’s right index finger before and after the 
visual-tactile stimulation (in both synchronous and asynchronous conditions) was taken as a 
measure of perceptual relocation, which was averaged and used as a dependent variable. All data 
were assessed for normal distribution using the Shapiro-Wilk test (p>0.05). In the main experiment, 
for the emb-q-rating in both synchronous and asynchronous conditions, the residuals were not 
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normally distributed (p=0.00146 and p=0.0092), so the Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used for 
pairwise comparisons. In the control experiment, in both synchronous and asynchronous conditions 
for the emb-q-rating (p=0.08448 and p=0.60427) and the disemb-q-rating (p=0.88009 and 
p=0.34168), the residuals were normally distributed, so comparisons between synchronous and 
asynchronous stimulations were computed by means of a paired T-test (two tailed). In both 
experiments, residuals for the proprioceptive drift were normally distributed (main: p=0.91975 and 
p=0.71247; control: p=0.90201 and p=0.37482), so comparisons between synchronous and 
asynchronous stimulation were computed by means of a paired T-test (two tailed). For each test 
performed, we reported mean, standard deviation, p (significance) value and Cohen’s d value 
(calculated as within-subjects effect sizes using G Power matched pairs statistical tests). All subjects’ 
behavioural data are available in an additional source data file (see Figure 2—source data 1 and 2). 
 
3.2.6 Physiological measures and analysis 
MEP amplitude of the FDI muscle was measured as the peak-to-peak distance (in MV), and MEPs of 
amplitude lower than 50 MV were discarded from analysis (Rossini et al., 1994; Borroni et al., 2008). 
For each subject, 20 measurements of MEP baseline values were acquired at the very beginning of 
the experiment in order to provide a reference value that could be used a) to verify that, during the 
on-line data acquisition, the cortical excitability was unchanged in the second experimental block of 
visual-tactile stimulation compared to the first one and b) to compare, during data analysis, the 
obtained MEP values in the experimental blocks (in order to discriminate between facilitation or 
inhibition effects). Normal distribution of the residuals was checked using the Shapiro-Wilk test 
(p>0.05), and the appropriate non-parametric tests were applied when one or more of the 
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corresponding data sets failed to meet the criteria for normal distribution. In both experiments, for 
each subject, we used MEPs recorded in each experimental condition (baseline, asynchronous and 
synchronous trials, a total of 60 trials), to obtain a grand-mean and a grand-standard-deviation. 
Then, each single trial was transformed in z-scores, according to the following formula: (x – grand-
mean)/ (grand-standard-deviation), where x indicates a single trial value. The obtained values were 
averaged for each subject and entered into two separate (for the main and control experiments) 
three-level (baseline, asynchronous, synchronous) one-way ANOVAs. In this analysis, for the main 
experiment, the distribution of residuals in the synchronous condition was not normal (respectively: 
p=0.70962, p=0.08347, p=0.00604). Thus, we performed Friedman non-parametric ANOVA in order 
to detect significant differences across the three conditions (baseline, asynchronous, synchronous); 
therefore, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were used for pairwise comparisons. Finally, for each pairwise 
comparison (N = 3), Bonferroni correction was applied (a value/n of comparisons: 0.05/3 = 0.017). 
In the control experiment, residuals of the three conditions were normally distributed (respectively: 
p=0.60988, p=0.44773, p=0.66546) and the ANOVA normality assumption was satisfied. Further-
more, we investigated the time course of MEP change in the synchronous condition of both 
experiments in order to describe, for each subject, a MEP amplitude time-profile during the illusion. 
MEP z-scores for all participants were divided into four blocks of five MEPs each. The obtained values 
were averaged starting from 0 to 5 (TIME 1), from 6 to 10 (TIME 2), from 11 to 15 (TIME 3) and from 
16 to 20 (TIME 4), and entered in a four level one-way ANOVA (TIME: one, two, three, four). Residuals 
for the main experiment were not normally distributed, so Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were used for 
within comparisons of the four-level time variable; for each pairwise comparison (N = 4), Bonferroni 
correction was applied (a value / n of comparisons: 0.05/4 = 0.0125). Finally, in order to compare 
MEP modulation in the two experiments, we avoided classical ANOVA because residuals in the main 
  
75 
 
experiment were not normally distributed. So, we calculated a delta on raw MEP amplitude between 
synchronous minus asynchronous for all subjects in each experiment; then the obtained values were 
analyzed with Mann-Whitney U-test. For each statistical test, we reported mean, standard deviation, 
p value and Cohen’s d (calculated as within-subjects effect sizes using G Power matched pairs 
statistical tests). All subjects’ physiological data are available in additional source data file (see Figure 
3—source data 1 and 2). 
 
3.2.7 Correlation analysis 
In the main experiment, linear regressions were performed between emb-q rating and 
proprioceptive drift in both synchronous and asynchronous conditions and in the delta synchronous 
minus asynchronous. In these correlations, the distribution of residuals, checked with Shapiro-Wilk 
test, was not normal, so we adopted the Spearman rank-order correlation. In the control 
experiments, linear correlations were performed between emb-q-rating and disemb-q-rating in both 
synchronous and asynchronous conditions and in the delta synchronous minus asynchronous; 
moreover, linear regressions between proprioceptive drift and emb-q-rating/disemb-q-rating in 
both synchronous and asynchronous conditions and in the delta synchronous minus asynchronous 
were performed. In these correlations, residuals, when checked with the Shapiro-Wilk test, were 
normally distributed. We acknowledge that the present experimental design was not ideally suited 
to investigate correlations, due to the fact that behavioral and physiological data were acquired in 
two separate sessions. Indeed, we could not obtain the behavioral responses during the registration 
of each MEP recording (due to time constraints during MEP acquisition) and, therefore, we could 
not have a point-by-point matching between those data. Furthermore, only responder subjects were 
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admitted to the physiological experiment, i.e. we use only subjects who gave ratings higher than 
zero in the synchronous condition in the embodiment questionnaire administered during the 
behavioral experiment. Thus, in the present sample, which only includes responder subjects, 
correlations between physiological parameters and the presence/absence of the illusion cannot be 
investigated. However, to investigate whether responder subjects who experience a larger 
subjective illusion also show a larger decrease in MEP amplitude, we computed correlations, using 
either ratings of the questionnaire or proprioceptive drift values. In both cases, we used two 
different approaches: a) we normalized MEP values, ratings and drift values by using z-scores to 
compute independent correlations for synchronous and asynchronous conditions: significant 
correlations with MEPs were not found, neither for questionnaire ratings nor for proprioceptive 
drift; b) for MEP values, ratings and drift values, we computed a delta (synchronous minus 
asynchronous) value and performed correlations on these values: again, no significant correlations 
with MEPs were found for questionnaire ratings or for proprioceptive drift. 
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3.3 Results 
The main behavioral results showed that both proprioceptive drift towards the RH and embodiment 
questionnaire rating (emb-q-rating) were significantly higher in the synchronous than in the 
asynchronous condition (drift=mean ± sd: 4.51 ± 4.2 cm vs. 2.08 ± 2.75 cm; t(23)=2.783, p=0.0105, 
dz=0.58; emb-q-rating=mean ± sd: 2.4 ± 0.64 vs. 2 ± 0.9, Z=4.2857, p=0.000018, dz=3.88; Figure 2A1 
and A2; see also Figure 2—source data 1). No significant correlation was found between emb-q-rating 
and proprioceptive drift. In the control behavioral experiment, similar results were found for both 
proprioceptive drift and emb-q-rating (drift=mean ± sd: 2.47 ± 2.707 cm vs. 0.075 ± 2.461 cm; 
t(19)=5.275, p=0.000043, dz=1.18; emb-q-rating=mean ± sd: 2 ± 0.763 vs. 0.97 ± 1.387; t(19)=9.357, 
p=0.0000001, dz=-2.1; Figure 2,B1 and B2; see also Figure 2—source data 2). Furthermore, the 
disembodiment questionnaire rating (disemb-q-rating) was significantly higher in the synchronous 
than in the asynchronous condition (disemb-q-rating=mean ± sd: 0.153 ± 1.427 vs. 1.15 ± 1.371; 
t(19)=3.835, p=0.00116, dz==0.86; Figure 2,B3; see also Figure 2—source data 2). Finally, significant 
correlations were found between emb-q-rating and disemb-q-rating in both synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions and in the delta synchronous minus asynchronous (respectively: r-=-
0.4911, p=0.0279; r-=-0.7128, p=0.0004; r-=-0.5537, p=0.0113; Figure 2,C1,C2,C3). No significant 
correlation was found between proprioceptive drift and either emb-q-rating or disemb-q-rating.  
For the physiological data, the Friedman non-parametric ANOVA showed a significant effect of 
condition (ꭓ2[2, n=24] =9,000,000; p=0.01111), suggesting a difference between baseline, synchro-
nous and asynchronous conditions, when MEPs were recorded from the stimulated (right) hand. 
Wilcoxon matched pairs tests, after Bonferroni correction, revealed a significant MEP decrease in 
the synchronous condition with respect to both the asynchronous (mean ± sd: 0.367 ± 0.362 vs. 
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0.205 ± 0.395; Z=3.3143, p=0.000919; dz=0.85) and the baseline (mean ± sd: 0.367 ± 0.362 vs. 0.277 
± 0.691; Z=3 .1428, p=0.001673; dz=0.74) conditions (Figure 3A1; see also Figure 3—source data 1). 
No significant difference was found between asynchronous and baseline conditions (0.205 ± 0.395 
vs. 0.277 ± 0.691; Z=0.1714, p=0.863887; dz=0.08). Examples of MEPs recorded from the FDI muscle 
of a representative subject are shown in Figure 3. Interestingly, the MEP time-course analysis 
showed that the inhibitory motor response increases over time, with lower values measured at each 
time-point. Note that Wilcoxon matched pairs tests, after Bonferroni correction, showed a 
significant difference between TIME 1 (first five trials) and TIME 4 (last five trials) (mean ± sd: 0.23963 
± 0.425821 vs. 0.5481 ± 0.394248; Z=2.942857; p=0.003252; dz=0.72), Figure 3A2; see also Figure 
3—source data 1. By contrast, in the control physiological experiment, in the three-level one-way 
ANOVA, no significant effect of condition was detected (F(2,38)=0,894943; p=0.417068), suggesting 
that for the non-stimulated (left) hand there is no difference between the synchronous condition 
and either the asynchronous (mean ± sd: 0.104 ± 0.399 vs. 0.045 ± 0.262; p=0.820737; dz=0.26) or 
baseline (mean ± sd: 0.104 ± 0.399 vs. 0.0572 ± 0.368; p=0.711483; dz=0.22) conditions (Figure 3B1; 
see also Figure 3—source data 2). Moreover, in the four-level one-way ANOVA adopted for analysis 
of MEP time-course, no significant effect of TIME was found (F(3,57)=0.842673; p=0.476191), 
suggesting that in the non-stimulated (left) hand, MEP amplitude is not modulated over time (Figure 
3B2; see also Figure 3—source data 2). Additionally, the Mann-Whitney U-test revealed a significant 
difference between the delta synchronous minus asynchronous obtained in each experiment, 
showing a strong physiological effect of the RHI in the main compared to the control experiment 
(mean ± sd: 390.746 ± 591.662 vs. 49.0296 ± 238.332; Z=2.074180; p=0.038063). 
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FIG 2. Behavioral results following asynchronous and synchronous condition. The average values for proprioceptive drift and emb-q-
rating are plotted in A1 and A2, respectively, for the main experiment, and in B1 and B2, respectively, for the control experiments. In 
B3 are reported average values for disemb-q-rating. Error bars indicate 95% CI. Significant levels: *p<0.05; ***p<0.0001. Linear 
regressions between emb-q rating and disemb-q-rating in both synchronous and asynchronous conditions and in the delta 
synchronous minus asynchronous are plotted in C1, C2, C3, respectively. All subjects behavioral data are available in the additional 
source data file (see Figure 2—source data 1 and 2). 
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FIG 3. Physiological results for the baseline, asynchronous and synchronous conditions. Average MEP amplitude variation in the FDI 
muscle recorded across all subjects are plotted in A1, for the main experiment, and in B1 for the control experiments. Histograms 
represent the peak-to-peak MEP mean amplitude (normalized) ± 95% CI in the baseline, asynchronous and synchronous conditions, 
respectively. Significant levels: **p<0.005; ***p<0.0001. Average MEP amplitude profile recorded across all subjects in the 
synchronous condition are plotted in A2 for the main experiment and in B2 for the control experiment; points represent the peak-
to-peak MEP mean amplitude (normalized), ± 95% CI, at four time-points after induction of the illusion (90 s, 180 s, 270 s 360 s); 
significance level: **p<0.005. Examples of average raw MEPs recorded from two representative subjects (for the main and control 
experiments) in the baseline (main: 609 µVolt; control: 619 µVolt), asynchronous (main: 771 µVolt; control: 601 µVolt) and 
synchronous (main:150 µVolt; control:583 µVolt) conditions. All subjects’ physiological data are available in an additional source 
data file (see Figure 3—source data 1 and 2). 
 
  
81 
 
3.4 Discussion 
In the present study, in order to investigate the link between body-ownership and motor system, we 
took advantage of the well-established RHI paradigm (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 
2004; Tsakiris et al., 2010; Longo et al., 2008; Moseley et al., 2008; Kammers et al., 2011; Rohde et 
al., 2013; Folegatti et al., 2009; Lewis and Lloyd, 2010; Valenzuela Moguillansky et al., 2013; Tsakiris 
and Haggard, 2005), a useful tool to manipulate the sense of body ownership in normal subjects. In 
the main behavioral experiment, our data show a very strong embodiment effect in the synchronous 
condition (with a mean rating of 2.4, on a scale of 3 to +3), while none of the subjects reported the 
illusory experience in the asynchronous condition (with a mean rating of 2, on a scale of 3 to +3). A 
complementary disembodiment effect (Longo et al., 2008) was investigated and measured in the 
control behavioral experiment, showing a significant correlation between the reported ownership of 
the fake hand and disownership of the subject’s own hand. Most importantly, the physiological 
results provide the first evidence that, during the RHI, the motor excitability of corticospinal hand 
circuits for the real stimulated hand is greatly reduced. This effect is absent for the real non-
stimulated hand. In addition, consistent with behavioral studies reporting an increased illusory 
experience over time (Lewis and Lloyd, 2010; Valenzuela Moguillansky et al., 2013), the time-course 
analysis revealed that motor cortex excitability decreases as time of exposure to the illusion 
increases. The link between body ownership and motor system activation has been investigated with 
different behavioral paradigms within the RHI framework. Recently, using a moving version of the 
RHI, it has been shown that voluntary (but not passive) movement of the real hand decreases the 
perceptual shift towards the rubber hand, suggesting that the subjective sense of agency strongly 
contributes to a coherent sense of body ownership (Tsakiris et al., 2010). On the other hand, patients 
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with schizophrenia, who show a specific deficit in predicting the consequences of their voluntary 
actions (Voss et al., 2010), as well as an altered sense of agency (Garbarini et al., 2016; Daprati et al., 
1997; Maeda et al., 2012), are more susceptible to the RHI (Peled et al., 2003; Asai et al., 2011; 
Thakkar et al., 2011). Other studies on clinical populations with movement disorders suggest that 
patients with focal hand dystonia (Fiorio et al., 2011) or partial or complete paralysis because of 
spinal cord injury (Scandola et al., 2014; Tidoni et al., 2014) seem to have some impairment of body 
ownership, according to their susceptibility to the RHI paradigm. A recent study (Burin et al., 2015), 
investigating the RHI in movement disorder after brain-damage, shows that hemiplegic patients 
display a weaker/more flexible sense of body ownership for the affected (paralyzed) hand (where 
the strength of the RHI is increased) when compared to controls, but an enhanced/more rigid sense 
of body ownership for the healthy hand (where the strength of the RHI is decreased). In other words, 
the prolonged absence of movement makes the paralyzed limb more readily disowned, while the 
healthy limb seems to be more strongly owned. Furthermore, other studies (Kilteni et al., 2016; 
Schütz-Bosbach et al., 2006) have investigated the modulation of corticospinal excitability during 
different experimental manipulations related to the sense of body ownership, though none with the 
specific hypothesis of linking a decrease in subjective ownership with a decrease in motor excitability. 
Kilteni and colleagues (2016) found that healthy people can experience a pseudo-amputation illusion 
during a virtual reality procedure, suggesting that this experimental manipulation causes 
corticospinal excitability changes in muscles associated with the virtually amputated body-part.  
Schütz-Bosbach and colleagues (2006) studied how an action observation task can induce different 
changes in corticospinal excitability, depending on the level of ownership experienced with respect 
to the observed moving hand. Ownership was previously manipulated using the RHI procedure: after 
asynchronous stimulation, observing others’ actions facilitated the motor system, whereas after 
  
83 
 
synchronous stimulation, identical observed actions, now illusorily attributed to the subject’s own 
body, evoked smaller MEPs. In light of our findings, the absence of facilitatory effect during 
observation following synchronous stimulation can be interpreted as resulting from the decreased 
corticospinal excitability induced by the illusion. Taken together, these results suggest that body 
ownership and the motor system are mutually interactive and both contribute to the dynamic 
construction of bodily self-awareness in healthy and pathological brains. In the present study, we 
found that the excitability of motor pathways in response to stimulation of the real (disembodied) 
hand is significantly decreased (i.e., MEP amplitude was significantly reduced) when subjects 
experience the artificial hand as their own. This suggests that an experimental manipulation of the 
sense of body ownership is accompanied by a coherent modulation of the motor system. However, 
as the experimental design was not suited to investigate correlations (see details in Material and 
methods), the present data do not allow us to address the question of whether subjects who 
experience a larger subjective illusion also show a larger decrease in MEPs. The presence or absence 
of linear correlations between MEP amplitude and behavioral measures, including both embodiment 
of the rubber hand and disembodiment of the real hand, will be investigated in future studies, in 
which physiological parameters of responder and non-responder subjects can be also compared. It 
has been suggested that active movements integrate distinct body parts into a unitary body 
representation (Tsakiris et al., 2010). When this unified representation is altered, as during the visual-
tactile conflict induced by the illusion, the excitability of the primary motor cortex is also altered, 
suggesting that the motor readiness of the real (disembodied) hand could also be reduced. We 
ascribe the excitability decrease in the primary motor cortex (M1) to cortical inhibitory processes tied 
to the central processing of hand ownership, possibly reaching M1 via inhibitory input from the 
premotor cortex (which is known to play a crucial role in the multisensory integration processes that 
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give rise to the sense of body ownership) (Ehrsson et al., 2004). The present findings, which shed new 
light on our understanding of the different aspects that contribute to the formation of a coherent 
self-awareness, suggest that bodily self-consciousness strictly depends on the possibility of 
movement. The bodily self is primarily and originally construed in terms of motor potentiality for 
actions (Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2010). If I believe that the hand is mine, then I must be ready to use 
it; if not, then the activity of the motor system is accordingly down-regulated. 
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Chapter 4 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The aim of this thesis is to shed new light on the contribution of the sensory-motor system to the 
experience of one’s own body, combining the phenomenological conception of the bodily-self and 
the scientific investigation of the cognitive processes underlying it. Starting from phenomenology, 
the conscious experience of being-in-the-world rises from our body and has a dual structure: a pre-
reflective (lived) sense of the body and a reflective (thought) sense of the body (Husserl, 1936; 
Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Recently, also cognitive neuroscientists have begun to recognize the central 
role of the body as the origin of our conscious experience (Csordas, 1990; Thompson and Varela, 
2001; Heiner, 2008; Barsalou, 2008; Gallagher, 2005; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Proffitt, 2006), by 
focusing their experimental investigation on the processes underlying the experience of a coherent 
sense of body ownership. The complex experience of body ownership is conceptualized as being 
shaped by different sub-components: a body schema, i.e. an implicit sensory-motor representation 
of the body, which corresponds to the phenomenological pre-reflective sense to own a body; and a 
body image, i.e. the explicit representation of the body in terms of visual, sensory-motor and 
emotional features, which corresponds to the reflective sense to own a body. The continuous 
interaction between the two is constantly shaped by the sense of embodiment, process on which we 
rely in order to experience an “object” (including all our body parts) as part of our body (de 
Vignemont, 2011). For instance, when we use a tool, the boundaries of our body are extended, 
objects we want interact with, previously out of our hand reaching space, are perceived as closer to 
us, and the tool then becomes a ‘‘bodily auxiliary, an extension of the bodily synthesis’’ (Merleau-
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Ponty, 1962, p. 152). Merleau-Ponty said: “The blind man’s stick has ceased to be an object for him, 
and is no longer perceived for itself; its point has become an area of sensitivity, extending the scope 
and active radius of touch, and providing a parallel to sight” (1962, p. 143). Recently, changes in our 
perceived body-environment-space occurring during tool-use (Maturana & Varela, 1987) have been 
described with a multidisciplinary approach: in physiology (Graziano et al., 1994; Fogassi et al., 1996; 
Duhamel et al., 1996; Iriki, Tanaka and Iwamura, 1996), in neuropsychology (Marshall & Robertson, 
2013; Berti & Frassinetti, 2000; Neppi-Mòdona et al., 2007) and in cognitive science (Sposito et al., 
2012, Cardinali et al., 2009; Costantini et al., 2011; Maravita et al, 2002). However, ‘‘the feeling of 
ownership that we have for our bodies clearly does not extend to, for example, the fork we use at 
dinner” (Botvinick, 2004, p. 783). In this view, it seems that the embodiment of a tool does not 
include a full sense of ownership, and only modifies the motor side of the body representation (De 
Preester & Tsakiris, 2009). Therefore, it would be more appropriate to talk about a change in the 
sense of ownership when a non-corporeal embodied object fits in with a pre-existing model of the 
body that regulates which objects sufficiently resemble body-parts, based on postural, anatomical 
and visual clues (as in the case of the RHI) (Tsakiris, 2010). Body ownership is deeply interconnected 
with the feeling that we are in control of what we are doing with an “object”; this sense of agency 
(Gallagher, 2005; Haggard et al., 2002; Tsakiris, 2010) results in the experience of oneself as owning 
a body as agentive (Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011). From a neural point of view, it has been suggested 
that body ownership is served by processes that integrate multisensory signals concerning our body, 
the space around us and the possibility to move in the environment. In turn, those processes are 
served by a network that comprehends high-order associative brain areas (Ehrsson et al., 2004; 
2005; Blanke et al., 2015; Martel et al., 2016) in which somatosensory and motor information seem 
to play a crucial role in the emergence of body ownership. It appears that focusing on aspects of 
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object embodiment (such as tools or RH) may offer a very valuable resource to investigate high-
order body representations and their plasticity (Martel et al., 2016). Within this context, in order to 
better describe the contribution of sensory-motor system to body ownership, this thesis focused on 
two experimental models: body ownership alteration following brain injuries (pathological 
embodiment, Chapter 2) and disruption of body ownership following multisensory illusion (rubber 
hand illusion, Chapter 3).  
The study presented in Chapter 2, sought behavioral evidence supporting the idea that the influence 
of tool-use training (grasp to place via garbage plier) on the body spatial representation is affected 
by a distorted body ownership in brain damaged patients. The patients we described claim to own 
someone else’s arm when the alien arm is egocentrically aligned with the patient's contralesional 
shoulder (E+ condition). The main question was whether an altered sense of ownership of body parts 
(embodiment of an alien arm) 1) extends to the representation of the movement of the alien arm 
using tools and 2) modulates the sensory map of the own arm. A control group of healthy subjects 
(Experiment 1) were asked a) to actually perform the tool-use training with their own arm (action 
condition) or b) to observe an alien arm (the examiner's arm) performing the tool-use training, while 
holding (observation with-tool condition) or not (observation without-tool condition) a similar tool. 
The results of Experiment 1 replicate previous findings (Sposito et al., 2012; Cardinali et al., 2009), 
confirming that, in healthy subjects, active tool-use induces dynamic changes in the representation 
of body metrics. On the other hand, we did not replicate the findings of Costantini and colleagues 
(2011), which showed that observing an alien arm performing finalized actions with a tool may 
extend the representation of the reaching space of the observer, but only when the latter shares the 
same action potentialities with the agent. In our experiment in healthy subjects, active tool-use is 
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necessary in order to induce dynamic changes in the body-metrics representation, whereas tool-use 
observation alone is not sufficient. In Experiment 2, patients were asked to try to perform the tool-
use training with their own (paralyzed) limb, while the alien arm performed the tool-use training 
acting either in the E+ position, where the pathological embodiment systematically occurs, or in the 
E- position, where the embodiment does not occur. In the E+ condition patients showed an over-
estimation of their own forearm length after tool-use training performed by the alien (embodied) 
arm. In the E- condition they did not show any overestimation effect. This clearly suggests that an 
altered sense of body ownership can extend to intentional motor processes and modulate own body 
spatial representation. Furthermore, comparing the results of single patients with those of normal 
subjects’ sample, the overestimation effect revealed by each patient during the E+ condition was 
greater than that found in healthy subjects, suggesting that when body ownership is selectively 
impaired, the body-metrics representation is more susceptible to being altered (effect that could 
also be driven by the severity of brain circuit lesions). More interestingly, this delusion of ownership 
affects both the motor awareness and the sense of agency (patients, although not anosognosic 
before the task are firmly convinced to perform the tool-use training with their own plegic arm), 
which in turn, might automatically trigger intentional motor processes for the own plegic arm and 
generate the updating of the body schema, resulting in the remapping of one's own forearm length 
(similarly to healthy subjects actually performing the tool use training in the Active condition). 
Neuroimaging data showed that pathological embodiment is related to damage to subcortical motor 
structures (basal ganglia: globus pallidus, putamen) and periventricular white matter (Garbarini et 
al., 2013a, 2014; Pia et al., 2013a). This pattern is consistent with the one identified for being 
responsible for somatoparaphrenia (Gandola et al., 2012), suggesting a common locus for the two 
complementary body awareness disorders. In E+ patients seems that a damage to the white matter 
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tract linking subcortical structures with cortical sensory-motor and associative areas may prevent 
the integration of afferent information arising from the affected body part (bottom-up processes) 
with higher-order and pre-existing body representations (top-down processes), leading to a deficit 
in the construction of a coherent body representation (Tsakiris et al., 2006, 2007, 2008). In line with 
that, this condition might also be interpreted as a disconnection deficit. In E+ patients, given the 
subcortical and white matter lesions, hard-wired body representations could result isolated from 
their sensory counterpart; this deficit would entail patients to experience part of the body belonging 
to other individuals and may generate on it intense sensory experiences such as those experienced 
on their real limbs. Alternatively, we may speculate that when the representation of the 
contralesional hand is impaired or made fragile by the brain damage, as in E+ patients, the 
incoherence of the “mutilated” body representation is solved by automatically incorporating an alien 
hand in order to regain consistency and functionality.  
In Chapter 3, in order to investigate the link between body ownership and motor system, we 
physiologically studied the state of sensory-motor system during the RHI, a useful tool to manipulate 
the sense of body ownership in healthy subjects (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 2004; 
Tsakiris et al., 2010; Longo et al., 2008; Moseley et al., 2008; Kammers et al., 2011; Rohde et al., 2013; 
Folegatti et al., 2009; Lewis and Lloyd, 2010; Valenzuela Moguillansky et al., 2013; Tsakiris & Haggard, 
2005). The processes behind the incorporation of the RH are still under debate; according to the 
body-model constrains, embodiment must respect some basic anatomical restrictions, so that only 
some objects under certain circumstances can be processed as if they were parts of one's body (de 
Vignemont & Farnè, 2010). It follows that there can be only two hands represented, a left hand and 
a right hand, so, one should expect the embodiment of the rubber hand to be associated with a 
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disembodiment of the biological hand, as if the biological hand were replaced by the artificial one 
(de Vignemont & Farnè, 2010). Based on this assumption, we expected that a disembodiment effect 
during the RHI might be measurable as a lower excitability of motor pathways to the real hand; we 
hypothesized that if the RH really replaces the real hand, allowing subjects to experience 
disownership towards it, then this very high-order experience should also be reflected in a decreased 
activity of the sensory-motor system underlining the motor control of the biological (deluded) hand. 
In particular, we studied the excitability modulation of the primary motor cortex areas controlling 
the real (stimulated, right) hand (Experiment 1) and the contralateral (not stimulated, left) hand 
(Experiment 2_control). In Experiment 1, while subjects received visual-tactile stimulations, either 
synchronous (to induce the illusion) or asynchronous (control condition), motor evoked potentials 
(MEPs) were elicited by a single-pulse of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over the left 
primary motor cortex (M1) and recorded from the right first dorsal interosseous muscle (FDI) with 
self-adhesive bipolar surface electrodes. In Experiment 2, we replicated the same procedure, but in 
this case, MEPs were elicited by single-pulse TMS of the hand area in the right M1 and recorded the 
left FDI. In both experiments, behavioral data (questionnaire and proprioceptive drift) show a very 
strong embodiment effect in the synchronous condition; moreover, a disembodiment effect (Longo 
et al., 2008) was investigated and measured in the control experiment, showing a significant 
correlation between the reported ownership of the fake hand and dis-ownership of the subject’s own 
hand. These behavioral data are in favor of the replacement hypothesis, so that when subjects report 
feeling of ownership over the RH, they contemporary report feeling of dis-ownership towards their 
real hand. Most importantly, the physiological results provide the first evidence that, during the RHI, 
the motor excitability of corticospinal hand circuits for the real stimulated hand is greatly reduced 
(Experiment 1). This effect is absent for the real non-stimulated hand (Experiment 2). In addition, 
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consistent with behavioral studies reporting an increased illusory experience over time (Lewis and 
Lloyd, 2010; Valenzuela Moguillansky et al., 2013), the time-course analysis revealed that motor 
cortex excitability decreases as time of exposure to the illusion increases. These results clearly show 
that an experimental manipulation of the sense of body ownership is accompanied by a coherent 
modulation of the motor system. It has been suggested that the possibility to move constantly shape 
the perception of our bodily experience (Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011) and that active movements 
integrate distinct body parts into a unitary body representation (Tsakiris et al., 2010). When this 
unified representation is altered, as during the visual-tactile conflict induced by the illusion, the 
excitability of the primary motor cortex is also altered, suggesting that the motor readiness of the 
real (disembodied) hand could also be reduced. We ascribe the excitability decrease in the primary 
motor cortex (M1) to cortical inhibitory processes tied to the central processing of hand ownership, 
possibly reaching M1 via inhibitory input from the premotor cortex (which is known to play a crucial 
role in the multisensory integration processes that give rise to the sense of body ownership) (Ehrsson 
et al., 2004; 2005; Blanke et al., 2015). However, a limitation of the study is that our measure does 
not tell the whole story about “that’s my hand” recognition pattern process, and we can neither be 
sure that only the premotor cortex produces active inhibition on M1 (which in this vision could results 
a readout-only) nor exclude the possibility that M1 does really participate to the building-up of hand-
myness. Further investigations, both structurally and functionally, and more compelling evidences are 
needed to better clarify the role of sensory-motor system in hand/body ownership. This work had the 
goal to do so and represents a major advance in our understanding of the sense of body ownership 
by demonstrating that the state of the sensory-motor system is intimately tied to a limb’s current 
state of embodiment (Miller & Farnè, 2016). 
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In conclusion, the results presented here shed new light on our understanding of the different 
aspects that contribute to the formation of a coherent self-awareness. In both Chapter 2 and 3 we 
showed that body ownership and the motor system are mutually interactive and that both 
contribute to the dynamic construction of bodily self-awareness in pathological and healthy brains. 
Patients with primary sensory-motor impairment and right parietal lesion do not recognize their 
limbs as their own and perceive them as belonging to others (somatoparaphrenia) or, under certain 
circumstances, claim to own someone else’ limb (pathological embodiment, Chapter 2). On the other 
hand, when in healthy subjects an experimental body ownership alteration causes feeling of dis-
ownership towards one’s own hand (RHI, Chapter 3), the excitability of the sensory-motor circuit for 
that hand is decreased. According to the body-model hypothesis, in order to experience ownership 
over a body part, whatever the nature of the embodiment process, pathological (Chapter 2) or 
physiological (Chapter 3), several constrains have to be respected: body-specificity (viewed object 
has to resemble a body-part, and not a neutral object), anatomical restrictions (the body-part has to 
be in a posture that is anatomically plausible and congruent with the posture of the subject’s own 
body-part), and body-part identity (same handedness as the subject’s stimulated body part) (Tsakiris 
et al., 2007; Tsakiris, 2010). By contrast, it has recently been reported that people can have the 
experience that an artificial hand is a supernumerary limb belonging to their own body (Gusterman 
et al., 2011). This perceptual illusion arises when a rubber hand is placed beside the participant’s 
real hand in full view and both hands are brushed on corresponding sites in a synchronous manner. 
These findings challenge the traditional view of the gross morphology of the human body as a 
fundamental constraint for own-body perception, and instead suggest a highly flexible model of the 
body representation, which can be reshaped to include an extra limb.  
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These evidences show that the sense of embodiment is phenomenologically complex and its 
relationship with body ownership is far from being fully understood. It follows that the body-model 
hypothesis needs to sharpen its basic assumption of what embodiment is, how it relates to body 
ownership and which are the conditions that designate an object as embodied (de Vignemont, 2011); 
in fact, not always the embodiment of an objects is reflected in a perceived change in the feeling of 
ownership, as in the case of embodiment of tools (Botwinick, 2004), possibly because there is no 
visual correspondence between the tool and a pre-existing high-order model of our body (De 
Preester & Tsakiris, 2009). Furthermore, under certain circumstances, such as the RHI (as well as in 
disorders after brain injuries), humans can experience somatic sensations that seem to violate the 
human body plan. 
A good solution to this theoretical problem is (reasonably) assuming that embodiment is a necessary 
condition for body ownership, i.e. “I cannot feel that an object is mine without the same object being 
embodied” (de Vignemont, 2011). Moreover, embodiment should be conceived in a double 
appearance: perceptual and motor. The first one corresponds to the representation of the embodied 
object into the subject’ body image (as in the case of RHI), while the second indicates the 
representation of the embodied object into the subject’ body schema (as in the case of tools) (de 
Vignemont & Farnè, 2010). The authors continue arguing that: 
“perceptual embodiment and motor embodiment may follow different rules, based on the functional 
roles of the body representations within which external objects are integrated. Arguably, what is 
required for action is not the same as what is required for perception…tools can be motorically 
embodied, while it is still an open question whether it can be perceptually embodied. On the other 
hand, multiple rubber hands can be perceptually embodied, while they cannot be motorically 
embodied”.  
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According to de Vignemont and Farnè (2010), for the biological body these two processes are always 
present and not dissociable; but this is not the case for tools (only motor) and RH (only perceptual) 
embodiment.  
I agree with the view that for the moment we can only account for a motor component of the 
experience of tool embodiment. However, the data presented in this thesis do not completely fit 
with the embodiment conception of bodily-shaped objects, which could be just perceptual. We 
showed that there is always a motor counterpart involved in perceptual embodiment, be it 
pathological (Chapter 2) or experimentally (Chapter 3) induced. Our findings demonstrate that, in E+ 
patients, the embodiment of the alien body part is so deeply felt that it extends to action execution 
and it induces measurable dynamic changes in the body-metric representation (Chapter 2). 
Moreover, during the RHI (Chapter 3), we showed that when participants feel like the RH is part of 
their body, the real (deluded) hand is felt less vividly, and its motor state is also lowered, providing 
direct motor measure of what, until now, has only been conceptualized as a perceptual embodiment. 
Gibson’s theory of perception claims that we see things in relation to their possible uses and every 
object perception recalls a motor interaction with it (1979), so why should it not be the same for a 
body-shaped object temporarily believed to be ours? 
I’d like to end this thesis by proposing a change in the theoretical conception of body ownership 
grounded on the sense of embodiment, which bring us back to the phenomenological conception of 
the bodily self from which we started.  
The lived-body (leib), or the implicit representation of our body, which well fits with the notion of 
body schema and motor embodiment, is the first principle of our conscious experience, and has an 
intrinsic and primary sensory-motor nature (Husserl, 1936; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Gallagher, 2005). 
It follows that every high-order experience originates from it. The explicit representation of our 
  
95 
 
body, the object-body (korper), which well fits with the notion of body image and perceptual 
embodiment, cannot be conceptualized without the sensory-motor component that allows its 
emergence (Varela, 1996). This philosophical insight has been confirmed in a recent study on a 
patient who, after a vascular tumor resection at the level of medulla oblongata, reports no 
somatosensory sensations from the right upper limb (a condition known as deafferentation). The 
researchers showed that a tool cannot be incorporated into the patient’ body schema because the 
lack of somatosensory sensations, and concluded that the sense of proprioception is a necessary 
condition for body schema dynamic change (Cardinali et al., 2016).  
In my view, the sense of embodiment is an experience emerging at different levels of complexity, 
rather than mainly composed by two different aspects (motor and perceptual). The first step which 
allows us to develop the feeling of body ownership is to be sensory-motor embodied (first level); 
this level reflects our unconscious experience to have a body, and comprehends action oriented body 
schemas (Maturana & Varela, 1987; Varela, 1999). In parallel with one of the most important 
theories of cognitive development we could also indicate this stage as sensorimotor stage (Piaget, 
1952; 1954; 1964). During this period, children’s early manifestations of intelligence appear from 
motor activities and sensory perception, which is the reason why Piaget indicates this stages as 
sensorimotor. According to him, intellectual growth is a process of continuous adaptation to the 
environment, which emerges thanks to the presence of schemas. “A schema is the basic building 
block of intelligent behavior a way of organizing knowledge..a set of linked mental representations 
of the world, which we use both to understand and to respond to situations” (Manichander et al., 
2016, pp 46). As a child gets older, his or her schemas become more numerous and elaborate thanks 
to two key processes: assimilation (using an existing schema to deal with a new object or situation) 
and accommodation (the schema needs to be changed to deal with a new object or situation).  
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At the end of this period, having had enough experience of interaction with the environment, we 
become able to mentally represent part of our previous sensory-motor experience, and from this 
process the sense of perceiving ourselves as perceptually embodied appears (second level). 
Following Piaget, we could also indicate this stage as the initial formation of object permanence 
(Piaget, 1952; 1954; 1964), which reflects a child's understanding that objects continue to exist even 
though they cannot be seen or heard. Is from now on that children begin to develop symbols to 
represent events or objects (also themselves) in the world and, during this time, they begin to move 
towards understanding the world through mental operations rather than purely through actions 
(Piaget, 1952; 1954; 1964). 
Finally, from the constant interaction and co-existence of the previous levels, the complex capacity 
to represent ourselves as the object of our experience emerges (third level). This last qualitative leap 
would correspond to the beginning of symbolic thought (Piaget, 1952; 1954; 1964), which will result 
in the conscious belief to own our body. The idea being that in order to reach the third (more 
complex) level, one must live, retain and integrate the experience from the previous two levels. The 
upper level is always a new qualitative state, in which the features of the previous levels have been 
integrated to allow the emergence of a more complex phase of experience (Depraz, Varela & 
Vermersch, 2003). Knowledge is a continuous process of construction which does not progress at a 
steady rate, but rather in leaps and bounds (Piaget, 1952; 1954; 1964). Assuming that body 
ownership (and consciousness in general) is the result of a complex evolutionary process could allow 
scientists and philosophers to better understand how human beings developed the ability to think 
about themselves. This also implies that we should recognize a common process between different 
species for the emergence of body ownership and a landmark point from which we started to be 
consciously different. In non-human primates it has been demonstrated that the representation of 
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a limb as belonging to the body can be extended by experience beyond the monkey’s own bodies 
(Iriki et al., 1996; Graziano, 1999; Graziano et al., 2000). Moreover, it has recently been described 
that also in non-primate animals similar changing could be observed. A group of Japanese 
researchers tested the RHI paradigm in rodents, developing a new paradigm called rubber tail illusion 
(Wada et al., 2016). When the real and rubber tails were synchronously stroked, the mice responded 
as if their own tails were touched when the rubber tails were grasped. The same responses were not 
observed in the asynchronous (control) condition. These findings suggest that mice may experience 
ownership of their tails. But the very question is: do animals experience body ownership as humans 
do? Considering the three different level of complexity discussed above, we would probably claim 
that the experience of human beings has reached the most complex state of this evolutionary chain. 
So my answer would be “No, body ownership is qualitatively different between humans and other 
animals, especially if body ownership corresponds to the positive phenomenology of myness that 
goes beyond the mere experience of bodily properties. However, if we accept this definition, we 
would then have to claim that animals do not experience body ownership at all, contrary to the 
existing experimental evidence suggesting that mammals share a very rudimental level of body 
ownership experience. I suggest that this level corresponds to an implicit sensory-motor experience 
to own a body, and this assumption could explain why non-human primates may experience motor 
embodiment (tool incorporation). At the same time, we can also assume that this very low level can 
develop into something more complex, like perceptual embodiment, otherwise it would be difficult 
to explain ownership illusion in mice (rubber tail illusion). Supposedly only humans reached the last 
level, which is the capacity to put themselves as the object of their own experience, always starting 
from the same common ground, which is the sensory-motor system. 
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Anyway, it seems that we are far from reaching true answers to these fascinating questions; we need 
to improve our tools of investigations and be careful about easy over-interpretation. A shared 
definition of body ownership could help all researchers from different fields to better define new 
protocols capturing all its aspects, in healthy and pathological brain, as well as in animals. 
 
In light of what has been discussed, in order to improve our knowledge of the mind, researchers 
must turn their investigations into a multi-disciplinary approach, which can be realized only with the 
continuous comparison between different doctrines operating in this field. The best candidate to 
respond to this appeal seems to be the Neuro-phenomenological approach, which searches for a 
dialogue between cognitive science and phenomenology in the attempt to establish a methodology 
that takes into account the nature of the co-determination between the first-perspective and the 
third-perspective analysis of human experience (Varela, 2000). 
 
“Neuro-phenomenology is the name I am using here to designate a quest to marry modern cognitive 
science and a disciplined approach to human experience, thus placing myself in the lineage of the 
continental tradition of phenomenology. My claim is that the so-called hard problem...can only be 
addressed productively by gathering a research community armed with new pragmatic tools 
enabling them to develop a science of consciousness”  
(Varela 1996, p 330).  
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